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Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure
ALAFAiR S. BURKE*

After the exoneration of more than 200 people based on post-conviction DNA
evidence, a growing movement against wrongful convictions has called increased
attention to the prosecutorial suppression of material exculpatory evidence.
Commentators frequently study prosecutorialfailures to disclose as a form of

intentional misconduct, coloring both the description of the problem and the
recommended solutions. This Article, in contrast, explores how even ethical
prosecutors mightfail to disclose exculpatory evidence because offlaws in the Brady
doctrine itself-specifically, the Court's limitation of the doctrine to "material"
exculpatory evidence. The materialitystandardamplifies cognitive biases that distort
even an ethical prosecutor's application of Brady, leading to systematic underdisclosures of exculpatory evidence. The doctrine also inflates the tension between a
prosecutor's dual obligations to protect the innocent while punishing the guilty,
causing conscientious prosecutors to conclude they are "doing justice" by
suppressingexculpatory evidence that does not appearto be material.Accordingly, it
is the doctrine itself that must be reexamined.
This Article proposes a prophylacticopenfile rule to effectuate defendants'Brady
rights. This doctrinalmove would expand defendants 'federal constitutionalrights to
discovery, while respecting the Court's long-established view that only access to
material exculpatory evidence is essential to due process. The Article situates the
proposalwithin ajurisprudenceof constitutionalcriminalprocedurethatoftenfavors
clear rules over open-ended standards,and compares the currentneed to safeguard
defendants' Brady rights to the necessity more thanforty years ago to shift to a rulebasedapproach in Miranda v. Arizona to regulate custodial interrogations.
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INTRODUCTION

When the Supreme Court announced its landmark decision in Brady v. Maryland,'
it did so in grand language:
Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted, but also when criminal trials
are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is
treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of the Department of Justice states the
proposition candidly for the federal domain: "The United States wins its point
whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts." A prosecution that withholds
evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, would tend to
exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the
defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that
does not comport with standards of justice.... 2
For the first time, the Court recognized a constitutional dimension to discovery in
criminal cases and held that prosecutors have an obligation under due process to
disclose to the defense upon request any favorable evidence that is "material either to3
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."' 4
Forty-five years later, what once promised to be a "criminal procedure superhero
has become a target of the current movement against wrongful convictions, as
prosecutorial failure to disclose exculpatory evidence has been identified as a leading
contributor to criminal convictions of the innocent.5 Much of the blame for Brady's
failure to protect the innocent has been laid at the doors of the prosecutors charged
with the doctrine's effectuation. Commentators argue that Brady has become a "paper
tiger," 6 frequently and blatantly disregarded by prosecutors who have come to realize
that they can suppress exculpatory evidence with few repercussions other than higher
rates of conviction.7 Proposals for reform correspondingly focus on the ethics of8
prosecutors, calling, for example, for judicial oversight of prosecutorial disclosure,

1. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2. 1d.at 87-88.
3. Id.at 87.
4. Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroesand ConstitutionalMirages: The Tale ofBrady v.

Maryland, 33 McGEORGE L. REv. 643, 643 (2002).
5. See Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S.TEx. L. REv. 685,
686 (2006) ("Reflecting on this landmark decision forty-three years later, one is struck by the
dissonance between Brady's grand expectations to civilize U.S. criminal justice and the grim
reality of its largely unfulfilled promise.").
6. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REv. 693, 707-08 (1987).
7. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
8. Darryl K. Brown, The Decline ofDefense Counselandthe Rise ofAccuracy in Criminal

Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1585, 1636-38 (2005) (advocating judicial inspection of law
enforcement investigatory files); Daniel J. Capra, Access to ExculpatoryEvidence:Avoiding the
Agurs Problemsof ProsecutorialDiscretionand Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REv.
391, 427-28 (1984) (proposing in camera hearings in which the adjudicator would select for

presumptive disclosure all evidence "favorable to the defendant's preparation or presentation of
his defense").
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increased enforcement of ethical rules that require prosecutorial disclosure of all
evidence favorable to the defense, 9 and financial incentives to encourage prosecutors to
disclose exculpatory information.10
Without disputing the importance of ajustice-oriented culture among prosecutors,
this Article argues that Brady has failed in its promise to protect the innocent, not just
because prosecutors violate the doctrine, but because of the limited scope of the
doctrine itself. Specifically, the caveat in Brady that prosecutors must disclose
exculpatory evidence only when it is "material either to guilt or to punishment"'" has
hindered defendants' access to the kind of exculpatory evidence whose disclosure
Brady held to be fundamental to due process.
Although the word "material" might at first blush seem so immaterial in the original
Brady opinion, surrounded as it was by such sweeping and ambitious rhetoric, that
single word has since proven a significant restriction on a prosecutor's constitutional
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. Brady's progeny have made clear that
prosecutors are not constitutionally obligated to disclose all exculpatory evidence, or
even all relevant exculpatory evidence. 12 In fact, the definition of "material"
exculpatory evidence is so restrictive that it is probably best articulated not as a duty of
the prosecutor to disclose, but as a narrow exception to a prosecutor's general right to
withhold evidence from the defense. Under Brady's progeny, a prosecutor can
constitutionally withhold all evidence, except for3 exculpatory evidence that "creates a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist."'
This Article advocates a doctrinal move that would expand defendants' federal
constitutional rights to discovery, while respecting the Court's long-established view
that only access to material exculpatory evidence is essential to due process. The
Article finds the necessary doctrinal move in the form of prophylactic rules, which, by
definition, respect the conceptual boundaries of defendants' core constitutional rights,
and yet permit the creation of rules designed to effectuate the exercise of those rights.
Although a defendant's core right to discovery under due process entitles him only to
evidence that is both exculpatory and material, the Brady doctrine alone is insufficient
to ensure the protection of that core right. After forty-five years ofjurisprudence under
Brady, the judiciary has failed to provide coherent guidelines to prosecutors who
remain uncertain of the scope of their disclosure obligations. Moreover, as this Article
explores in more detail, the current constitutional standard amplifies cognitive biases
that will distort even an ethical prosecutor's application of Brady and systematically
lead to under-disclosure of exculpatory evidence. The current materiality standard also
inflates tensions between a prosecutor's obligations to protect the innocent and convict
the guilty. A prosecutor seeking to balance her dual roles may conclude that she is
"doing justice" by suppressing exculpatory evidence that does not appear to meet the
Court's definition of materiality. As a result of both of these problems, even

9. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
10. Tracey L. Meares, Rewardsfor Good Behavior:InfluencingProsecutorialDiscretion
and Conduct with FinancialIncentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 851, 910 (1995) (proposing
financial incentives for good prosecutorial conduct, including the disclosure of favorable
evidence to the defense).
11. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
12. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
13. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976).
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conscientious prosecutors might fail to disclose even the narrow band of evidence to
which defendants are entitled under Brady. Accordingly, as a necessary means of
protecting defendants' Brady rights, prosecutors should be required to disclose more
broadly.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief overview of the
prosecutor's constitutional obligation to disclose, which applies only to evidence that is
both exculpatory and material. Part II explores the ways in which the materiality
requirement hinders Brady's original objective of protecting the fairness of criminal
trials. Part III compares this Article's call for a prophylactic rule to protect Brady
rights to the rule created in Miranda v. Arizona 14 to protect a defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination. It analogizes the current need to safeguard defendants'
access to material exculpatory evidence to the necessity more than forty years ago to
shift to a rule-based approach to regulate custodial interrogations. It also situates the
Article's proposal more broadly into a jurisprudence of constitutional criminal
procedure that often favors clear rules over open-ended standards. Finally, Part IV
explores the proper scope of a prophylactic rule to govern prosecutorial disclosure and
concludes that a defendant's access to true Brady material can be ensured only through
open file discovery, in which prosecutors turn over both inculpatory and exculpatory
evidence. The Article concludes with proposals to reduce the costs of the proposed
prophylactic rule.
I.

THE FAILURE OF BRADY: THE MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT

The Court's landmark decision in Brady, as well as the moral tone of the language
in which it was couched, held the promise of transforming the role of prosecutors in
American criminal trials.' 5 Presumably if due process could not tolerate prosecutors as
architects of one-sided trials, then the Constitution would require them instead to be
protectors of their own opponents in the courtroom-guardians of fairness rather than
mere participants in the gamesmanship of the adversarial process.16 Some of Brady's
progeny might appear to buttress this ambitious vision, requiring prosecutors to
disclose not only directly exculpatory evidence but also evidence that can be used to
impeach government witnesses;' 7 to disclose not only upon request but on their own
initiative;' 8 and to disclose all Brady evidence in the government's possession, even if
the prosecutor is unaware of it. 19

14. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

15. Brady marked, as Stephanos Bibas has put it, "a potentially revolutionary shift from
traditionally unfettered adversarial combat toward a more inquisitorial, innocence-focused
system." Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the
Searchfor Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIEs 129 (Carol Steiker ed., 2006).

16. See Sundby, supra note 4, at 644 (noting that Bradycould have been "the constitutional
superhero that.., embodied the prosecutor's ethical duty to pursue 'justice' and not simply
victory in the courtroom").
17. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683-84 (1985) (requiring the government to
disclose evidence of charging or sentencing concessions to government witnesses ifthe evidence
materially affected the outcome); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972)
(extending the Brady rule to evidence that could be used to impeach government witnesses).
18. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107 (extending the prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose
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As lofty as Brady's transformative potential is in theory, other aspects of the
doctrine have significantly undermined its practical impact. Much of Brady's restricted
doctrinal scope is attributable to its treatment by the Court as a trial right in a criminal
justice system in which ninety-five percent of criminal convictions are obtained by
guilty plea. 20 Despite the prevalence of plea bargaining, the Court has shaped
prosecutors' disclosure obligations to apply only when a case is brought to trial. For
example, the Court has created no temporal aspects to Brady's requirements,
suggesting that as long as prosecutors produce all material exculpatory information
prior to trial, they have met their due process obligations.21
This Article focuses on the limitation of a prosecutor's disclosure obligation, even
in cases that proceed to trial, to exculpatory evidence that is "material." The Court's
original announcement in Brady that due process required prosecutors to turn over all
exculpatory evidence "material either to guilt or to punishment 22 was accompanied by
language suggesting that favorable evidence would be considered material as long as it
was not irrelevant.23 For example, the Court's description of evidence that "if made
available, would tend to exculpate ' 24 sounds not unlike the definition of relevance
under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a permissive standard that includes
material exculpatory evidence even when the defense has made no request for such
information).
19. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437 (1995) (holding the prosecution accountable for all
Brady material in the possession of law enforcement officials).
20. See generally Bibas,supra note 15, at 149-51 (criticizing Brady's lack of focus upon a
defendant's innocence in part because the doctrine is designed for trials when ninety-five
percent of convictions are based on guilty pleas); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The
Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 291, 352 (noting

that "the Brady duty does not apply, at least regarding exculpatory impeachment evidence,
unless the defendant goes to trial"); Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure,and
Wrongful Convictions,57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 651, 656-62 (2007) (arguing that the failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence in the plea bargaining context can lead to factually inaccurate
guilty pleas); Mary Prosser, Reforming CriminalDiscovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to

New Realities, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 541, 554-61 (noting that counsel's ability to negotiate plea
bargains can be impaired when its access to evidence is limited).
21. Andrew D. Leipold, How the PretrialProcessContributesto Wrongful Convictions,42

Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1150 (2005). Although some lower courts have attempted to accelerate
the timing of Brady's requirements to apply to plea bargaining, see Sanchez v. United States, 50
F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995); Banks v. United States, 920 F. Supp. 688, 691 (E.D. Va.
1996); Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590, 599 (W.D.N.Y. 1977), af'd,565 F.2d 233 (2d Cir.
1977), the Supreme Court is unlikely to follow suit, at least with respect to all Brady evidence.
In United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), the Court rejected a defendant's challenge to a
guilty plea that was contingent on the government's refusal to disclose impeachment evidence
and evidence relevant to affirmative defenses. Although the Court recognized the government's
obligation to disclose evidence bearing on a defendant's "factual innocence" during plea
negotiations, id. at 625, it otherwise characterized Brady narrowly. In its unanimous opinion,
the Court noted that "impeachment information is special in relation to thefairness of a trial,
not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary." Id. at 629 (emphasis in original).
22. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
23. See Sundby, supra note 4, at 646 (setting forth a "perfectly plausible reading" of
materiality that would require the prosecution to turn over favorable evidence as long as it was
relevant).
24. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88 (emphasis added).
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any evidence "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence
.. .more probable or less probable than it would be without the
25
evidence."
However, Brady's progeny make clear that the doctrine requires far less of
prosecutors. In UnitedStates v. Agurs,26 for example, the Court expressly rejected the
argument that prosecutors have an obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence
whenever it "might" affect a jury.27 In reasoning that revealed skepticism about the
competence ofjurors, the Court maintained that jurors might be swayed by "improper
or trivial" factors just as much as by "legitimate doubt., 28 Because of the unreliability
of easily manipulated jurors, requiring the prosecution to disclose everything that
29
might influence a jury would amount to a constitutionally mandated open file policy,
which the Court has repeatedly refused to impose as a component of due process.30
Instead, the Court held in United States v. Bagley 3' that prosecutors are obligated to
turn over exculpatory evidence "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. 3 2 A "reasonable probability" under Bagley is "a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome." 33 Although the defendant need not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the undisclosed information would have changed
the trial's outcome, he is required to show that "the favorable evidence could
reasonably be taken to put34the whole case in such a different light as to undermine
confidence in the verdict."
As a type of harmless error standard governing the availability of post-conviction
relief, Bagley's35 materiality standard might be a sensible approach to ensuring that
reliable convictions are not unnecessarily overturned on the basis of immaterial
evidence. But to see the materiality requirement merely as a limit on a defendant's
remedies is again to inflate the scope of the Brady doctrine itself Bagley's materiality
standard is not simply a harmless error test to determine whether a conviction should
be reversed because of a prosecutor's failure to disclose. It is the governing standard to

25. FED. R. EvID. 401 (emphasis added).
26. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
27. Id.at 108-10.
28. Id. at 109.
29. Id.
30. Id.; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987) ("A defendant's right to discover
exculpatory evidence does not include the unsupervised authority to search through the
Commonwealth's files."); Illinois v. Moore, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972) (holding that there is "no
constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the
defense of all police investigatory work on a case").
31. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
32. Id.
at 682.
33. Id.
(citation omitted).
34. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,435 (1995).
35. The materiality standard arose from the Court's decisions in Brady, Agurs, and Bagley.
However, for labeling purposes, this Article, like others, credits the current standard of
materiality to Bagley, the most recent case in the trilogy and the one in which the Court made
clear that materiality was the touchstone for determining disclosure, whether the defense
requested the discovery of exculpatory evidence or not, and regardless of how specific the
defense's request. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
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determine whether a prosecutor has in fact committed error.36 In other contexts, the
standards that determine the availability of an appellate remedy are distinguishable
from the standards that determine whether an error was committed in the first place.
For example, to reverse a defendant's conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel,
the second prong of Strickland v. Washington's37 two-prong test requires proof of a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different but
for the attorney's defective performance; however, the first prong requires that the trial
attorney provided reasonably effective assistance. Similarly, a defendant against
whom illegally seized evidence was admitted at trial will not obtain appellate relief if
he would have been convicted even in the absence of the evidence; 39 however, the
admission of the illegally seized evidence at trial is nevertheless error.
Bagley, in contrast, sets forth a single standard of materiality that determines both
whether a conviction should be reversed if the prosecutor fails to disclose evidence and
whether the prosecutor is required to disclose the evidence at all. It is not uncommon
for commentators to use the term "Brady evidence" to encompass all evidence
favorable to the defense, whether material under the Court's jurisprudence or not. That
nomenclature, however, inaccurately describes a prosecutor's constitutional duty to
disclose. Unless exculpatory evidence is material, due process does not require its
disclosure, and the evidence is not, in any fair sense, "true" Brady evidence. 40 "True"
Brady evidence is both exculpatory and material, and must be disclosed to the defense.
In contrast to true Brady evidence is what this Article will refer to as "Brady-type" 41
evidence, which is favorable to the accused but not material, and therefore outside of
Brady's disclosure mandate.

36. Eugene Cerruti, Through the Looking-Glass at the Brady Doctrine: Some New
Reflections on White Queens, Hobgoblins, and Due Process, 94 KY.L.J. 211, 213-14 (2005)
(noting that the Brady doctrine imposes a review standard higher than harmless error because a
prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence "becomes error only when a reviewing
court concludes that the nondisclosure of its own accord has produced a wrongful conviction at
trial").

37. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
38. Id.
at 687-94.
39. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53 (1970) (applying harmless error review to
admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
40. For example, the Court wrote in Kyles that the materiality requirement "requires less of
the prosecution than the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, which call generally for
prosecutorial disclosures of any evidence tending to exculpate or mitigate." See Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437 (1995) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2004);
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECuTION FuNcTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 3-

3.11(a) (3d ed. 1993)).
41. I attribute this term to Richard Rosen, who has described "Brady-type misconduct" as a
prosecutor's failure to comply with ethical rules that require disclosure of all favorable evidence
to the defense, even if the evidence does not rise to the level of materiality required by Bagley.
Rosen, supra note 6, at 696; see also Meares, supra note 10, at 909 n.232 (using same
terminology and attributing it to Rosen). For a discussion of the ethics rules requiring
prosecutorial disclosure beyond Brady, see infra notes 78 and 96-100 and accompanying text.
Here, I use the adjective "Brady-type" to describe not misconduct arising from the
nondisclosure of immaterial exculpatory evidence, but the evidence itself.
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Thus, in light of the true nature of Brady evidence, a literal application of Brady
requires little disclosure from prosecutors. If a conscientious prosecutor faces
exculpatory evidence that would shake her faith in any conviction she might obtain
without the evidence, then she will presumably dismiss charges against the defendant.
This would render disclosure of the evidence, and Brady itself, irrelevant.42 On the
other hand, if the exculpatory evidence does not undermine her belief in the
defendant's guilt, she is likely to conclude that the evidence will not affect the jury's
determination either. Accordingly, she would treat the evidence as immaterial and
therefore not within her Brady obligation. 43 Bradybecomes relevant only in a narrow
category of cases: those in which a prosecutor perceives a significant risk that an
appellate court might lose faith in the reliability of a conviction in light of the evidence
at issue, but nevertheless continues to believe both that the defendant is guilty and that
she can prove her case beyond a reasonable doubt despite the exculpatory evidence. 44
II.

CRrICISM OF THE MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT

Scholars have broadly condemned Bagley's materiality requirement. 45 Traditionally,
and most commonly, scholars have focused less on the Brady doctrine itselfthan on the
prosecutors whom Brady governs, arguing that the materiality requirement enables
overzealous prosecutors to avoid their constitutional and ethical obligations to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the defense. Not surprisingly, the reform proposals arising
from this literature tend to focus on measures designed to improve prosecutorial ethics
and deter prosecutorial misconduct. 46 This Article does not dispute that prosecutors
should "do justice," and that law reforms should deter misconduct and incentivize
ethical conduct. However, it argues that even virtuous prosecutors trying to do justice
can err in their good-faith attempts to apply the doctrine on its own terms. Accordingly,
Brady's failure ultimately rests with the materiality requirement itself, not just the
prosecutors who must apply it.
A. The Focus on ProsecutorialEvasion of Brady
Much of the literature on prosecutorial decision making depicts prosecutors as
zealous (and overzealous) advocates, motivated primarily to obtain and maintain the

42. Sundby, supra note 4, at 651-52.
43. Bibas, supra note 15, at 140 (noting that prosecutors may conclude that a piece of
evidence that does not shake their doubts about guilt will not matter to jurors either, "so the rate
of Brady disclosures could approach zero").
44. See, e.g., Leipold, supra note 21, at 1150 (stating that Brady asks "well-intentioned
prosecutors... to identify evidence that will help the defense after they have concluded that the
evidence supports a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt") (emphasis in original); Sundby,
supra note 4, at 653 (recognizing that "true" Brady material exists in "a narrow band of cases
indeed").
45. E.g., Gershman,supra note 5, at 718; Rosen, supranote 6, at 697; Joseph R. Weeks, No
Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutorsto Disclose

Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 833, 870 (1997).
46. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
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high conviction rates that earn them attention, praise, and future career success.47
Perhaps not surprisingly, the evaluation of a prosecutor's duty to disclose from this
perspective is a negative one, not because of the limited scope of the duty itself, but
because of the ease with which it can be evaded by prosecutors who value the next
conviction more than their obligations under Brady. With no oversight of their
determination of whether exculpatory evidence rises to the level of materiality, the
argument goes, prosecutors know they are their own watchers. 48 If they intentionally
suppress evidence that might jeopardize a conviction, they can do so in the comfort of
knowing there is little chance the evidence will ever come to light49and therefore only a
remote possibility of a challenge to their decision to withhold it.
Moreover, even ifthe defense does happen to learn about the prosecutor's failure to
disclose, the prosecutor can rely on Bagley's materiality standard on appeal and hope
that the exculpatory evidence does not rise to the level of true Brady material. 50 Based

47. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, PleaBargainingOutsidethe Shadowof Trial, 117 HARv. L.
REv. 2463, 2471 (2004) ("Favorable win-loss statistics boost prosecutors' egos, their esteem,
their praise by colleagues, and their prospects for promotion and career advancement."); Meares,
supra note 10, at 900 ("The prosecutor's professional success inevitably is linked to success at
trial and on appeal."); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a GoodProsecutor?, 14
GEO. J. LEGAL EThics 355, 390 (2001) ("The desire to win inevitably wins out over matters of

procedural fairness, such as disclosure."); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions:ItIs Time
to Take ProsecutionDisciplineSeriously, 8 D.C. L. REv. 275, 278 (2004) (stating that "a team
of police and prosecutors were so convinced of their righteousness that they were willing to do
anything to get their man" (quoting BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DwYER, ACTUAL
INNOCENCE 175-76 (2000))); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuringthe Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial
Practice:Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?,44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 108 (1991) ("Prosecutors who
restrain themselves may convict at a lower rate and thus appear less competent to their
superiors.").
48. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Perjury andFalse Testimony: Should the Difference Matter So
Much?, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1537, 1578-79 (2000) ("In our adversary system, any limitation
like 'materiality' invites prosecutors and their law enforcement assistants to make their own
biased judgments about materiality."); Tom Stacy, The Searchfor the Truth in Constitutional
CriminalProcedure, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1369, 1393 (1991) (noting that prosecutors have
exclusive access to their evidence and an incentive to withhold it).
49. Brown, supra note 8, at 1637 ("The Brady rule currently works poorly because
prosecutors decide both what is material and what is exculpatory.... [O]dds are that if a
prosecutor does not disclose it, the evidence will never be uncovered."); Findley & Scott, supra
note 20, at 351-52 (observing that Brady violations are brought to light only "through some
fortuity that usually occurs sometime after trial"); Gershman, supranote 5, at 687 ("Brady is...
virtually unenforceable when violations are hidden."); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias,
Regulating FederalProsecutors'Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REv. 381,470 (2002) (citing the failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence as an example of when prosecutors are less likely to self-regulate
because misconduct "stands some chance of remaining secret"); Meares, supra note 10, at 909
(noting that "it is probably fair to say that many instances of Brady-type misconduct are never
discovered and hence never reported").
50. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 393, 438 (1992)
(stating that, in practice, if"a conviction results, reversal will not be ordered unless an appellate
court can conclude that the trial jury probably would have acquitted the defendant had the
evidence been disclosed"); Gershman, supra note 5, at 715 (arguing that Brady invites
prosecutors to "withhold with impunity" due to a "rational belief" that the appellate court will
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on the empirical evidence, this gamble will usually pay off. Judges are predisposed to
affirming convictions. They are flooded by meritless criminal appeals and habeas
cases, making them quick to assume that a retrial would be a waste oftime. 51 They may
also suffer from hindsight bias, the tendency for people to overestimate the ex ante
likelihood of an event that has already occurred.5 2 Because the government has already
obtained a conviction, appellate judges might view that result as inevitable.5 3 It is
perhaps unsurprising, then, that only a small percentage of defendants successfully
demonstrate a reasonable probability that withheld evidence would have affected the
result of their proceedings. 54 Finally, even if the defense manages both to discover the
undisclosed evidence and to persuade a reviewing court that the evidence is material,
the prosecutor can simply retry the defendant, placing the prosecutor in roughly the
same position she would have found herself had she disclosed the evidence in the first
place.55
Given the role that prosecutorial ethics (and the lack thereof) play in the prevailing
description of Brady's shortcomings, most of the corresponding proposals to improve
defendants' access to exculpatory evidence have predictably focused on the values of
prosecutors. Although reform proposals vary in their emphases, a common underlying
assumption is that prosecutors who care more about justice than their personal
conviction rates will disclose broadly. Accordingly, scholars have invited changes to
the prosecutorial culture that might cause prosecutors intrinsically to value doing
find no reasonable probability of a different result); Janet C. Hoeffel, ProsecutorialDiscretion
at the Core: The GoodProsecutorMeets Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1133, 1145-46 (2005)
(stating that prosecutors know courts are quick to view withheld evidence "as harmless in
hindsight"); Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruptionand New Modelsfor Reform, 35 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 1, 35 (2001) (noting the difficulty of showing materiality on appeal); Rosen, supra
note 6, at 707-08 ("[A] prosecutor knows that a decision to withhold or falsify evidence, even if
discovered, will not necessarily result in a reversal of the conviction.").
51. Bibas, supra note 15, at 143 (noting that "jaded judges find it hard to spot the
occasional innocence needle in the haystack"); Hoeffel, supranote 50, at 1145-46 (stating that
"appellate courts have shown themselves to be predisposed to upholding convictions").
52. See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight --Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on
Judgment Under Uncertainty,1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE
288, 298 (1975); Baruch Fischhoff& Ruth Beyth, "IKnew it Would Happen ": Remembered
Probabilitiesof Once-FutureThings, 13 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR &HUM. PERFORMANCE 1

(1975).
53. For a more thorough discussion of how hindsight bias can affect appellate judges in the
Brady and ineffective assistance of counsel contexts, respectively, see Bibas, supranote 15, at
143-44 and Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 2-7.

54. One study located only 270 federal and state court cases in the last forty years to result
in either a reversal of conviction or a new hearing due to withheld Brady material. Richard A.
Serrano, Withheld Evidence Can Give Convicts New Life, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2001, at Al
(citing the Habeas Assistance and Training Project study). More recently, Professor Bibas
examined 210 Brady cases decided in 2004 and concluded that less than twelve percent of them
succeeded. Bibas, supra note 15, at 144-45.
55. Hoeffel, supranote 50, at 1146 (noting that "a reversal simply calls for a retrial, so that
the prosecutor is put in essentially the same position he was in prior to the [Brady] error");
Weeks, supra note 45, at 870 (arguing that Brady incentivizes nondisclosure because the

defense must first discover the evidence, then must demonstrate materiality, and can be retried
in any event).
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justice.56 Others have proposed ways of altering the values ofprosecutors extrinsically.
For example, calls for increased enforcement of the ethical rules governing
prosecutorial disclosure are seemingly unanimous.57 Other commentators argue that
Brady violations warrant not only professional discipline, but also civil 58 and even
criminal liability. 59 Still others have argued that as a disincentive to the risk-taking that
Brady currently encourages in prosecutors, the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against
double jeopardy should prohibit the government from retrying a defendant if his
conviction is reversed because of a Brady violation. 60 Emphasizing the carrot in
addition to the stick, Tracey Meares has suggested financial rewards for good
prosecutorial conduct, including the disclosure of Brady-type evidence to the
defense.6'
Without disputing the importance of an ethical prosecutorial culture or the need for
increased sanctions against unethical prosecutors, some scholars have begun to
question whether Brady's failure to provide defendants access to exculpatory evidence
62
is more attributable to the doctrine itself than to the prosecutors who implement it.
Here, prosecutors are depicted not exclusively as overzealous advocates indifferent to
the rights of criminal defendants, but also as well-intentioned lawyers struggling to

56. See Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a Trial": When Prosecutors Keep Score of
CriminalConvictions,9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 537, 546 (1996) (arguing that prosecutors should
be taught to "avoid behavior, such as score-keeping, that makes criminal trials resemble sporting
matches"); Zacharias, supra note 47, at 109 (noting that supervisors in prosecutors' offices can
instill a culture of promoting justice through training and other institutional reforms).
57. See Rosen, supra note 6, at 736 (calling for more stringent enforcement of breaches in
prosecutorial ethics resulting from Brady violations); Yaroshefsky, supra note 47, at 297-98
(advocating the creation of independent commissions to enforce disciplinary rules against
prosecutors); Michael E. Gardner, Note, An Affair to Remember: FurtherRefinement of the
Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 68 Mo. L. REv. 469, 480 (2003) ("The
obvious solution to the problem is rigorous enforcement of each of the states' respective rules of
professional conduct.").
58. See Margaret Z. Johns, ReconsideringAbsolute ProsecutorialImmunity, 2005 BYU L.
REV. 53, 147-48 (arguing that prosecutors should not enjoy immunity for Brady violations);
Weeks, supra note 45, at 933-34 (arguing that prosecutors should face personal liability "for the
most provable, deliberate, and egregious violations"). But see Hoeffel, supra note 50, at 1152
(considering but rejecting civil suits as a Brady reform because "the barriers to suit would be
practically insurmountable").
59. Shelby A.D. Moore, Who Is Keeping the Gate? What Do We Do When Prosecutors
Breach the Ethical Responsibilities They Have Sworn to Uphold?,47 S.TEX.L. REV. 801,82631 (2006) (suggesting increased use of criminal sanctions against prosecutors who intentionally
violate constitutional rights).
60. See David L. Botsford & Stanley G. Schneider, The "Law Game ":Why Prosecutors
Should be Prevented from a Rematch; Double Jeopardy Concerns Stemming From
ProsecutorialMisconduct, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 729 (2006); Adam M. Harris, Note, Two
ConstitutionalWrongs Do Not Make a Right: DoubleJeopardyand ProsecutorialMisconduct
Underthe Brady Doctrine,28 CARDOzo L. REv. 931, 944-53 (2006).
61. Meares, supra note 10, at 910.
62. See Alafair S. Burke, Comment, Brady's Brainteaser:The Accidental Prosecutorand
Cognitive Bias, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 575 (2008); Sundby, supra note 4, at 644
("wonder[ing]" if complaints about Brady violations were more attributable to the standard
itself than "to prosecutors failing to live up to their constitutional duties").
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apply an unworkable standard.63 The materiality standard serves as a single doctrine
both to govern prosecutorial disclosure and to determine whether a conviction should
be reversed based on a prosecutor's failure to disclose. 64 However, the standard is
written solely from the perspective of an appellate court reviewing a trial record postconviction. The standard is considerably less helpful to prosecutors trying to decide
whether to disclose evidence prior to trial. By its own terms, the materiality standard
requires a prosecutor to compare the evidence at issue to "the whole case"65 absent that
evidence (even though the case has not yet been tried), and then determine whether the
evidence is significant enough to undermine confidence in a conviction based on that
case 66 (even though a conviction has not yet been obtained). Because the doctrine
requires prosecutors making a prospective decision to apply a retrospective standard,
even well-intentioned prosecutors can have difficulties following the law. If
conscientious prosecutors who are trying to do justice are likely to err, then proposals
for reform must look to the doctrine itself and not exclusively to improvements in
prosecutorial ethics.
B. Why EthicalProsecutors Might Under-Disclose

Why then, should we criticize the materiality standard instead of the prosecutors
who apply it? After all, well-intentioned prosecutors can simply opt to disclose
evidence more generously than the Constitution mandates. Indeed, in defending the
materiality requirement, the Court has assumed that conscientious prosecutors will
engage in what this Article will refer to as "over-disclosure," 67 disclosing not only true

63. See Alafair S. Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1607 (2006) (noting that Brady requires
prosecutors to "engage in a bizarre kind of anticipatory hindsight review"); John G. Douglass,
FatalAttraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady andPlea Bargaining,50 EMORY L.J. 437,
471 (2001) ("It seems curious, to say the least, that a prosecutor has a constitutional obligation
before trial to disclose a category of information that cannot be defined until after trial.")
(emphasis in original); Findley & Scott, supranote 20, at 352 ("[Tlhe Brady test oddly imposes
a retrospective analysis on decisions that must be made prospectively, pretrial."); Sundby, supra
note 4, at 658 (maintaining that the materiality requirement results in "a somewhat odd and
circular spectacle: a pre-trial obligation that is defined through speculation on a post-trial
result").
64. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
65. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,435 (1995).
66. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (holding that evidence must be
disclosed under Brady only if it creates "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome").
67. By "over-disclosure," I do not intend to suggest that the disclosure is over and above
what is normatively preferred. Instead, the term refers to a prosecutor disclosing favorable
evidence that does not create a reasonable probability of a different result and is therefore not
required to be disclosed under Brady. See Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutorsand
InadequateDiscipline, 38 Sw. L.J. 965, 977 (1984) (noting that an appellate court would not
reverse a conviction based on a prosecutor's violation of Model Code of Professional
Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 7-103 if it did not also violate the more restrictive standard
under Brady); Sundby, supra note 4, at 650 (noting that the Court's case law distinguishes

"between what is ethically desirable as prosecutorial discovery and what is constitutionally
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Brady material, but also at least some non-material Brady-type evidence. For example,
the Court wrote in Agurs that "the prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in
favor of disclosure." 68 Similarly, in Kyles v. Whitley,69 the Court reasoned that "a
prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece
of evidence., 70 Many scholars also assume7 that prosecutors who value justice over
their conviction records will over-disclose. '
The view that virtuous prosecutors can avoid Brady errors by simply overdisclosing has considerable appeal. After all, as ministers ofjustice,72 prosecutors have
a duty to ensure that defendants receive fair trials.73 As the Court so famously wrote in
Berger v. United States, 74 the prosecutor "is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law.",75 It is her responsibility not to win a case, but to see that justice is
done.76 Accordingly, although she "may strike hard blows," she "is not at liberty to
strike foul ones.",77 Moreover, independent of Brady, ethical rules governing
prosecutors require them to disclose to the defense all favorable evidence, without any
restriction that the evidence be material.78
required").
68. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976).
69. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
70. Id.at 439.

71. Hoeffel, supranote 50, at 1142 ("Ifthe good prosecutor were the ethical prosecutor, he
would disclose to the defense all information favorable to the defense, without hesitation.... If

in doubt, he would err on the side of disclosure."); Johns, supranote 58, at 147 (arguing for the
eradication of prosecutorial immunity for Brady violations and noting that prosecutors "can
simply err on the side of caution and disclose more evidence than is actually required"); Samuel
J. Levine, Taking ProsecutorialEthicsSeriously: A Considerationof the Prosecutor'sEthical
Obligationto "Seek Justice" in a ComparativeAnalytical Framework,41 Hous. L. REv. 1337,
1356 (2004) (maintaining that ethical prosecutors "resolv[e] uncertainties in favor ofprotecting
the constitutional rights of the criminal defendant"); Sundby, supra note 4, at 660 (noting that
prosecutors are likely to disclose more than what is required "to be on the safe side and out of a
sense of ethical obligation").
72. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2004) (characterizing the prosecutor
as "a minister of justice" with "specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded
procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence"); see also
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (2004) (stating that the prosecutor's "duty is
to seek justice"). See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMrrH, UNDERSTANDING
LAwYERS' ETmIcs 11.01-.16 (2d ed. 2002) (describing "special ethical rules" applicable to
prosecutors).
73. Zacharias, supranote 47, at 49 (stating that prosecutors should do justice by not trying
innocent defendants and by ensuring that fair trials are provided to the rest).
74. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
75. Id. at 88.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) requires prosecutors to make "timely disclosure... of the
existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that tends to negate
the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment." MODEL
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (2004). The Model Rules impose an almost
identical obligation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT RULE 3.8(d) cmt. 3 (2004)
(requiring prosecutors to "make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense,
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This portrait of conscientious prosecutors ensuring fair trials, regardless of the
limits of applicable constitutional requirements, is an attractive one. However, the
portrait rests on two implicit assumptions. First, reliance on prosecutorial ethics to
repair Brady assumes that prosecutors will recognize when they have been thrown a
difficult Brady question. Prosecutors seeking to "resolve doubtful questions" 79 or to
avoid "tacking too close to the wind" 80 by erring on the side of disclosure must first
recognize that the materiality of a given piece of evidence presents a close question.
Second, it assumes that ethical prosecutors will necessarily view over-disclosure in
such cases as "doing justice." Each of these assumptions is questionable.
1. Prosecutors, Brady, and Cognitive Bias
As an initial matter, prosecutors may withhold material exculpatory evidence
without recognizing its full exculpatory value. Were the materiality standard merely
difficult to apply, we might safely assume that prosecutors would at least realize when
they were caught at the doctrine's blurry edges. However, Bagley's materiality
standard amounts not simply to a challenging doctrine, under which prosecutors are
just as likely to misapply the standard in one direction as the other. Instead, the
doctrine acts upon cognitive biases from which prosecutors, like all human decision
makers, suffer.81 Specifically, Brady amplifies confirmation bias, selective information
processing, and the resistance to cognitive dissonance in a manner that guarantees that
when prosecutors err in applying Bagley's materiality standard,
they will do so by
82
systematically underestimating, not overestimating, materiality.
and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged
mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this
responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal"). For a discussion of the weaknesses of
ethical rules as the sole mechanism through which to expand prosecutorial disclosure beyond
Brady, see infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
79. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976).
80. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,439 (1995).
81. A growing literature seeks to explain prosecutorial decision making in terms of human
cognition rather than intentional or reckless prosecutorial misconduct. See generally Susan
Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutorand Tunnel Vision, 49 How. L.J. 475,

479 (2006); Bibas, supra note 47, at 2496-2519; Burke, supra note 62; Alafair S. Burke,
ProsecutorialPassion,Cognitive Bias, and PleaBargaining,91 MARQ. L. REv. 183, 195-200

(2007); Findley & Scott, supra note 20; Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial
Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REv. 125, 140-41 (2004);
Myrna Raeder, What Does Innocence Have to Do with It?: A Commentary on Wrongful
Convictions and Rationality,2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1315, 1327.

82. Without exploring the cognitive mechanisms that can distort prosecutors' applications
of the Brady standard, others have noted that the doctrine requires objectivity that seems
intuitively unlikely. See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions:Do
We ReliablyAcquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 1317, 1375 (1997) (noting that when

prosecutors believe a defendant is guilty, they are likely to view evidence favorable to the
defense "as a 'red herring' with which defense counsel may make mischief'); Hoeffel, supra
note 50, at 1145 (stating that the prosecutor "is convinced of the defendant's guilt and he is
certain that a defense attorney will use this information to attempt to create reasonable doubt
where none exists"); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor'sMisconduct, 23 CRiM. L.
BULL. 550, 553-54 (1987) "[Tlhe prosecutor naturally tends to view weaknesses in his case not
as possible indicators of innocence but merely as a possible failure of proof .... ); Sundby,
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Confirmation bias is the well-documented tendency to favor evidence that confirms
one's working hypothesis.8 3 For example, researchers have found that subjects asked to
determine whether a person is an extrovert ask questions such as, "What would you do
if you wanted to liven things up at a party?" 4 Any answer to this question could only
support, and never disprove, the theory that the person being questioned was an
extrovert.
When a prosecutor initially reviews a case file, she does so to test the hypothesis
that the defendant is guilty. Because of confirmation bias, she is likely to search the
investigative file for evidence that confirms the defendant's guilt to the detriment of
any exculpatory evidence that might disprove the working hypothesis. She may, for
example, take note of the defendant's confession without questioning the circumstances
under which it was elicited or a lack of self-verifying detail within the confession. She
might search for a positive identification by an eyewitness without scrutinizing the
reliability of the procedure used to obtain the identification.
Once the prosecutor has conducted a search of the file and determined that the
defendant is guilty, she becomes subject to selective information processing. Selective
information processing is the tendency for people to accept at face value information
85
that is consistent with their existing beliefs, while devaluing inconsistent information.
Because the prosecutor now believes that the defendant is guilty, she will tend to give
more weight to evidence that buttresses her existing beliefs than to contradictory
evidence. In other words, she will accept at face value any new inculpatory evidence,
for example the testimony of an additional witness against the defendant, but she is
unreliable or irrelevant, such as
likely to cast aside potentially exculpatory evidence as
86
evidence suggesting that the witness may be biased.
A prosecutor's evaluation of potential Brady material may also be skewed by a
resistance to cognitive dissonance. The cognitive literature demonstrates that people
routinely adjust their beliefs to reconcile what would otherwise be a dissonance

supra note 4, at 654 (noting that Brady requires "a Zen-like state of harmonizing objective and
subjective beliefs"); Weeks, supra note 45, at 843 ("[T]he kind of objective determination of
materiality required by Bagley is capable of being made only by saints.").
83. See PETER C. WASON & PHILIP N. JOHNsON-LAIRD, PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING:
STRucTuRE & CONTENT (1972); see also ZIVA KuNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF
PEOPLE 112-17 (1999); J.Klayman & Y. Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation,andInformation
in Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REv. 211 (1987).
84. Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr., Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social
Interaction,36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1202, 1204 (1978).
85. E.g., Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilationand Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979).

86. For a more thorough discussion of confirmation bias, selective information processing,
and the ways in which these biases can affect prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory evidence,
see Burke, supra note 62, at 577-80. See also Alafair S. Burke, Neutralizing CognitiveBias: An
Invitation to Prosecutors,2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LInERTY 512, 518 (2007); Susan S. Kuo & C.W.
Taylor, In Prosecutors We Trust: UK Lessonsfor Illinois Disclosure,38 LoY. U. CHL. L.J. 695,
706-07 (2007) ("The quest for success can affect a prosecutor's ability to objectively weigh the

materiality of potentially exculpatory evidence, a phenomenon referred to as 'tunnel vision' or

'confirmatory bias."'); Sundby, supranote 4, at 655 (noting that cognitive biases could impede
prosecutors from recognizing materiality).
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between their beliefs and their behavior.8 7 Consider how this phenomenon might apply
to a prosecutor who pursued charges against a defendant only to be confronted later
with evidence suggesting the defendant's innocence. To avoid the cognitive dissonance
of having to admit that she may have charged an innocent person, the prosecutor is
likely to discount the exculpatory value of the new evidence and overestimate the
strength of her original case against the defendant.
In sum, Brady invites cognitive error. If a prosecutor is confronted with evidence
that falls short of a defense smoking gun and is only arguably "material," she may not
recognize the closeness of the Bagley question. Not only will she fail to over-disclose,
but she might also under-disclose by withholding true Brady evidence.
2. What is Doing Justice?
Relying on virtuous prosecutors to over-disclose also assumes that over-disclosure
is necessarily a component of "doing justice." This assumption, however, ignores the
tension between prosecutors' dual roles. 88 Although the literature on prosecutorial
ethics understandably emphasizes the prosecutor's role to guard against wrongful
convictions, prosecutors are also members of law enforcement, charged with obtaining
warranted convictions. Their "twofold" objective is to ensure "that guilt shall not
escape" nor "innocence suffer."89 Prosecutors take seriously the mandate that they do
justice, but, because of their dual roles, they are likely to define "justice" with
reference to the Supreme Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence. A prosecutor
seeking to balance her conflicting roles to convict the guilty while providing fair
process might rationally conclude that her obligation is to ensure that defendants
receive the rights to which they are due--but no more.
Janet Hoeffel illustrates this tension:
The prosecutor does not even think about "doing justice" in the sense the ethics
professors envision. What prosecutor would not believe he is doing justice by
fulfilling his concomitant duty to be a zealous advocate? Isn't the whole idea of
becoming a prosecutor to put the bad guys behind bars and keep the public safe?90

87. See Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced
Compliance, 58 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOL. 203, 204-06 (1959).
88. Bibas, supra note 15, at 132 ("Though conscientious prosecutors also want to free the
innocent and show mercy on sympathetic guilty defendants, at root, they see their job as
convicting and punishing the guilty."); Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek
Justice?", 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 608 (1999); Peter Joy, The Relationship Between
ProsecutorialMisconduct and Wrongful Convictions:Shaping Remediesfor a Broken System,

2006 Wis. L. REv. 399, 405; Zacharias, supra note 47, at 48 (noting tension between
prosecutors' obligations to vindicate defendants' rights and their responsibility to the public to
convict criminals).
89. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
90. Hoeffel, supra note 50, at 1140. Hoeffel goes on to argue that "asking prosecutors
simultaneously to advocate within a process and assure that the process is fair is inherently
contradictory-and perhaps hopeless." Id. at 1141. Instead, "we should fully expect the normal,
human, and good prosecutor to have the single-minded goal of winning the case for the
prosecution." Id. Accordingly, Hoeffel urges a move away from the adversarial process in
criminal cases to a more inquisitorial system. Id. My point is a more limited one. Rather than
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Indeed, even the Supreme Court has written that while the prosecutor has a duty to
prevent a wrongful conviction, it is also her duty "to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one." 9 1 Reversing the emphasis of the Court's famous mandate in
Berger, a diligent prosecutor might remind herself that she cannot strike "foul" blows,
but she may strike "hard" ones. 92 She must ensure that the defendant's rights are
respected, but she has no obligation to construe those rights any more generously than
has the Supreme Court to whom such constitutional questions are entrusted. Indeed, to
do so might undermine the prosecutor's responsibility to do justice.
To assume that all justice-doing prosecutors will necessarily err on the side of
caution and generously disclose evidence to the defense ignores the dual
responsibilities of prosecutors. The following anecdote might help to illustrate the gap
between real-world prosecutions and the idealistic notion that conscientious
prosecutors should disclose more than Brady requires of them. In on-campus
interviews at the law school where I teach, one local prosecutor's office presents job
applicants with the following hypothetical:
You have a trial scheduled on Tuesday morning on a robbery charge arising from a
purse snatching. At the end of business Monday, the defense attorney rejects the
state's most recent pretrial offer. Late Monday night, you get a phone call from the
victim's daughter; her mother-your eyewitness-has passed away. You can't
prove your case without the victim's testimony. Tuesday morning, the defense
attorney calls you and says, "My client chickened out. He'll take the deal if it's
still on the table." Do you let the defendant enter his plea, or do you tell the
defense attorney that the witness is dead, revealing that you are unable to proceed
to trial?
What, my students ask me, is the "right" answer? Being a law professor, I refuse to
answer the question and force them to answer it themselves. The typical response goes
something like this:
Brady is about preventing wrongful convictions and is therefore intended to cover
evidence that is material to a determination of the defendant's factual guilt or
innocence or to a determination of the degree of punishment upon conviction.93
Brady does not require me to disclose tactical observations about the strength of
my case or my preparedness for trial. Nevertheless, I would tell the defense
attorney this was her client's lucky day, because the system is made up of repeat
players, and I want that lawyer to trust me in the future and know that I am one of
the good ones.
At that point, I congratulate my student for the thoughtful and well-reasoned response.
I then change the hypothetical from a robbery to a rape case. And the witness died

reject the notion that prosecutors might concern themselves with the rights of defendants, Iseek
only to establish that, because of their co-existent responsibility to enforce penal laws,
prosecutors will not be quick to construe a defendant's rights more generously than the courts
whose job it is to define them in the first place.
91. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.

92. Id.
93. See supra note 21 (discussing Brady's limits in the plea bargaining context).
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because the trauma of her victimization drove her to suicide. "Now," I ask, "do you
still tell the defendant it's his lucky day?"
The lesson, I hope, is an obvious one. It is one thing to say in the abstract that
virtuous prosecutors should give defendants more than that to which the law entitles
them. It is another to apply that principle to the kinds of cases that prompt
prosecutorial stinginess. 94 Prosecutors are entrusted to protect the public, and even
conscientious prosecutors might reason that they stand on solid moral ground in
disclosing only true Brady material but nothing more.95
Even the existence of ethical rules requiring disclosure beyond Brady does not
ensure against under-disclosure. Because prosecutors are members of law enforcement,
empowered by the executive branch, they may see themselves bound only by
constitutional and statutory authorities, not by the rules that regulate other lawyers.96
97
Moreover, because the substantive training that they receive reflects this culture,
many prosecutors do not even realize that ethics rules require disclosure beyond true
Brady material. 98 The widespread failure of bar authorities to discipline prosecutorsboth for Brady-like violations" and even for true Brady violations'°---only contributes
to prosecutors' cultural isolation from the rules of the profession.

94. See Burke, supra note 81, at 189-90 (discussing how a prosecutor's "passion" for a
case can lead the prosecutor to treat the case differently from other files in her caseload).
95. Gershman, supra note 5, at 715-16 (maintaining that evidence may be withheld even
"by ethical prosecutors who attempt to balance their obligation to seek a conviction and at the
same time fulfill their constitutional obligation under Brady"); Rosen, supranote 6, at 732 ("It
is also likely that in most cases the prosecutor believes the defendant is guilty, and therefore
might be motivated by the concern that, in one sense, justice will not be served by revealing
evidence which will increase the probability that the defendant will go free.").
96. John M. Burkoff, ProsecutorialEthics: The Duty Not "To Strike FoulBlows ", 53 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 271, 274-75 (1992) (noting that prosecutors' groups and especially the

Department of Justice have criticized the American Bar Association's attempts to regulate the
conduct of prosecutors); Fred C. Zacharias, The ProfessionalDisciplineofProsecutors,79 N.C.
L. REv. 721, 761 (2001) (noting that bar authorities acting under the power ofthe judiciary may
be reluctant to discipline prosecutors because of concerns about the separation of powers).
97. See Kenneth J. Melilli, ProsecutorialDiscretionin an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L.
REv. 669, 686 (noting the lack of training in prosecutorial ethics); Steele, supra note 67, at 966
(observing that "prosecutors may have developed a sense of insulation from the ethical
standards of other lawyers" because of the "scant attention" paid to the ethics of prosecutors).
98. Burke, supranote 63, at 1629; Hoeffel, supranote 50, at 1146 (calling the assumption

that prosecutors are aware of their obligation to disclose favorable evidence under the
professional codes "a stretch"). The author is willing to confess in this footnote that, as a
practicing prosecutor for nearly five years, she was unaware of any discovery obligations
beyond those articulated in Brady and the local rules of criminal procedure.
99. Bruce A. Green, ProsecutorialEthics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 1573, 1593
(maintaining that "courts and disciplinary authorities do not sanction prosecutors for failing to
disclose evidence as required by the rule but not by other law").
100. Gershman, supra note 5, at 687 ("Brady is insufficiently enforced when violations are
discovered, and virtually unenforceable when violations are hidden."); Rosen, supra note 6, at
697; Weeks, supra note 45, at 898 ("[T]he disciplinary process has been almost totally
ineffective in sanctioning even egregious Brady violations."); Yaroshefsky, supra note 47, at
281-82; Zacharias, supra note 96, at 755.

2009]

REVISITING PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE

C. Repairingthe Doctrine
The Brady doctrine has failed to live up to its vision of providing defendants access
to exculpatory evidence. 10' Even if one accepts the Court's premise that due process
entitles defendants only to material exculpatory evidence, the Court's standard of
materiality invites prosecutors to systematically undervalue it. Because of cognitive
biases, prosecutors will overestimate the strength of their case in the absence of the
evidence at issue, underestimate the potentially exculpatory value of the evidence, and
therefore fail to recognize materiality even when it exists. Prosecutors seeking to do
justice may also feel obligated to use every legally permissible maneuver to convict a
defendant they believe is guilty, and therefore will not necessarily disclose exculpatory
evidence to the defense if they believe the evidence is immaterial.
Simply to ensure that defendants receive the material exculpatory evidence to which
the Court believes they are entitled, the legal standards governing prosecutorial
disclosure must be changed. This Article is not alone in its call for a broadening of
prosecutors' disclosure obligations beyond material exculpatory evidence. Several
scholars have argued that the materiality standard is too rigid and that defendants
should be entitled under due process to receive all evidence that is favorable to the
defense. 0 2 However, changing the scope of the minimum disclosure that is required by
due process presents both theoretical and practical hurdles. As a theoretical matter, it is
difficult to maintain that withholding a single piece of favorable evidence necessarily
deprives the defendant of his basic right to a fair trial under due process. For example,
suppose the defendant is charged with robbing a bank. In a well constructed line-up, all
fifteen witnesses identified the defendant as the culprit. When the defendant was
arrested outside the bank, he was carrying the stolen cash, complete with the dye pack
inserted into the money bag by the teller. The defendant's fingerprints were found on
the demand note. Suppose also that the bank teller, one of the fifteen witnesses, was
intoxicated, and the prosecutor suppresses this fact from the defense. In some sense,
the withheld intoxication evidence is favorable to the defense; it could be used at trial
to undermine the teller's eyewitness identification. Nevertheless, if the trial was in all
other respects an ideal process, it would be difficult to argue that the defendant's trial
was so flawed that it constitutes a "failure to observe that fundamental fairness

101. See Bibas, supra note 15, at 129-30 (noting that Brady has failed to transform criminal
procedure in practice); Capra, supra note 8, at 397 (arguing that "the spirit of Brady,based as it
is on equality of access to exculpatory evidence before and during trial, cannot be effectuated by
putting the pre-trial burden of determining favorability on the prosecutor"); Sundby, supranote
4, at 644 (lamenting the fact that "Brady is not the constitutional superhero that I once
thought").
102. See Findley & Scott, supranote 20, at 352 (stating that the dissent in UnitedStates v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 695-96 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting), which would have required
disclosure of all evidence "that might reasonably be considered favorable to the defendant's
case," "might have had it right"); Hoeffel, supra note 50, at 1151-52 (describing a rule
requiring disclosure of all "favorable information" as more favorable than Brady); Note, The
Prosecutor'sConstitutionalDuty to Reveal Evidence to the Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964)
(arguing prior to the Court's definition of"materiality" that a prosecutor's disclosure obligations
under Brady should be measured by the impact of evidence on a defendant's ability to prepare
for trial).
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essential to the very concept of justice."' 0 3 It is precisely because the minimal
requirements of due process can be met without full disclosure of wholly immaterial
evidence that the Court adopted the materiality requirement. '04 Moreover, as a practical
matter, even if a litigant persuasively argued that every deprivation of favorable
evidence amounted to an automatic0due
process violation, the Court would be unlikely
5
to reverse a long list of precedent.
To avoid revisiting Supreme Court precedent, other scholars have advocated for
legal changes outside the Court's constitutional jurisprudence, such as amendments to
the rules of criminal procedure' 0 6 or the recognition of broader discovery rights in state
constitutions. 107 Although these reforms could broaden disclosure, they require stateby-state legislation or litigation and therefore lack the sweeping impact of a change to
federal constitutional doctrine. This Article's alternative proposal for legal reform is
the creation of a prophylactic rule to protect
defendants' rights under due process to
8
receive material exculpatory evidence. 10

103. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).

104. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (holding that the standard for
determining materiality "must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of
guilt").
105. See, e.g., Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (holding that exculpatory evidence is material "only if
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different"); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 114 (holding that the
prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial under due
process because it did not create a reasonable doubt when viewed "in the context of the entire
record"); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (requiring disclosure of evidence "material
to guilt or to punishment").
106. See Gershman, supra note 5, at 725 ("[B]roadening the discovery rules in criminal cases
might insure greater compliance by prosecutors with their disclosure obligations under Brady v.
Maryland."); Hoeffel, supra note 50, at 1152 ("[A]t the very least, we could make nondisclosure
a rule violation."). Currently, neither Rule 16 nor Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, governing discovery and plea bargains in federal criminal cases, respectively,
requires the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. See FED. R. CRm. P. 11, 16; cf Am. Coll. of
Trial Lawyers, ProposedCodificationof Disclosure ofFavorableInformation UnderFederal
Rules of CriminalProcedure11 and 16, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 93 (2004).

107. Weeks, supra note 45, at 903-14 (looking to state law to find broader disclosure rights
than Brady provides).
108. One scholar has previously suggested a prophylactic rule requiring open file discovery
to remedy state interference with defense counsel's duty to investigate. See Jenny Roberts, Too
Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial
Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 1097, 1153-54 (2004). She did not,

however, analyze a prophylactic rule designed to effectuate core Brady rights.
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III. A CASE STUDY INPROPHYLACTIC RULES: MIRANDA V.ARIZONA
Although scholars use different terminology to define prophylactic rules,' 09 the term
is generally understood to describe rules that, in order to protect a constitutional right,
provide protection above and beyond the guarantees bestowed by the underlying
constitutional right itself 10 Because prophylactic rules are distinguishable from the
core rights they are designed to protect, this doctrinal approach to prosecutorial
disclosure would permit the creation of broad discovery obligations while respecting
the Court's limitation of a defendant's "core" discovery rights to only material
exculpatory evidence.
Although criminal procedure jurisprudence "is rife with prophylactic rules,"'
perhaps no prophylactic rule is as famous as the rule crafted by the Court in Mirandav.
Arizona.112This Part first summarizes the Court's jurisprudence concerning custodial
interrogations as a paradigmatic example of the judiciary's use of prophylactic rules. It
then situates Miranda into a broader context of the Court's use of bright-line rules in
constitutional criminal procedure and argues that the same considerations that justify a
rule-based approach to criminal procedure in Miranda and other contexts justifies a
prophylactic rule requiring disclosure from prosecutors beyond material exculpatory
evidence.

109. See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)FormulatingProphylacticRules, Safe
Harbors,andIncidentalRights in ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure,99 MICH. L. REv. 1030,

1032 (2001) ("A 'constitutional prophylactic rule' is ajudicially-created doctrinal rule or legal
requirement determined by the Court as appropriate for deciding whether an explicit or 'true'
federal constitutional rule is applicable."); Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional
Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 926 (1999)

(describing prophylactic rules as "those risk-avoidance rules that are not directly sanctioned or
required by the Constitution, but that are adopted to ensure that the government follows
constitutionally sanctioned or required rules"); cf Evan Caminker, Miranda andSome Puzzles
of "ProphylacticRules ", 70 U. CN. L. REv. 1, 1 n.2 (2001) (arguing that the term "prophylactic
rule" is "generally more misleading than helpful," but describing the term as referring to
"doctrinal rules self-consciously crafted by courts for the instrumental purpose of improving the
detection of and/or otherwise safeguarding against the violation of constitutional norms").
110. See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword:ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1,
21-22 (1975); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of ProphylacticRules, 55 U. Cmi. L. REv. 190,

195, 208 (1988). But see Caminker, supra note 109, at 28 n.91 (arguing that the notion that
prophylactic rules over-protect is misplaced, because if the rules dictate what is constitutionally
required, then the underlying right that provides less protection actually under-protects).
111. Klein, supra note 109, at 1042-44 (listing the following among other examples of
prophylactic rules: the Fourth Amendment's warrant rule, the automobile inventory exception to
the warrant rule, Miranda,the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against imposing multiple
punishments in a single trial, and the Sixth Amendment's presumption of incompetency if a
defense attorney has an actual conflict of interest due to multiple representation).
112. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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A. The Road to Miranda
The justifications for the Court's creation of a prophylactic rule in Mirandaare best
understood in relation to the prior regime governing police interrogation of suspects. "3
Prior to Miranda,the admissibility of an unindicted suspect's confession turned solely
on a case-by-case determination of whether the confession was voluntary or was
instead the involuntary product of police coercion. The origins of the Court's
"voluntariness" test can be traced to the Court's 1897 decision in Brain v. United
States,114 in which the Court held that an involuntary confession violated the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against compelled incrimination. 1" 5 The immediate impact of
Brain was limited, however, because the self-incrimination clause was not incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable to the states until 1964. 16
' That
did not, however, leave interrogations by state actors entirely beyond the Court's reach.
1. Due Process Protections
The facts that triggered the Court's involvement in state confessions were horrific.
In Brown v. Mississippi,17 three African-American suspects confessed to murder after
they were physically beaten by police cooperating with white vigilantes. One defendant
was first attacked by a group of white men, hung from a tree, and whipped, but
nevertheless maintained his innocence. He confessed only after the arresting police
officer whipped him again and declared that the attacks would continue until he
confessed. The other two men were also tortured,
laid over chairs at the jail, and
8
whipped bare-backed until they confessed."
Without the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause to rely on, the Court
turned to the basic rights of due process:
The rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness stand. The
State may not permit an accused to be hurried to conviction under mob
domination-where the whole proceeding is but a mask-without supplying
corrective process.... The due process clause requires "that state action.., shall
be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions." It would be difficult to conceive of
methods more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the
confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus obtained
as the
9
basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process." 1

113. See Paul G. Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot: 18 US.C. § 3501 and the
OverhaulingofMiranda, 85 lowA L. REv. 175, 192 (1999) ("The dramatic changes wrought by
Miranda are best understood by comparing the new rules to those in place before the
decision."). For a brief but excellent overview of Miranda's historical context, see JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 388-92 (2d ed. 2000).
114. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
115. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

116. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (holding Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination applicable to state court proceedings).
117. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
118. Id. at281-82.
119. Id. at 285-86 (citations omitted).
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After Brown, then, the admissibility of an unindicted defendant's confession was
determined through a case-by-case determination of voluntariness, whether the
defendant challenged his confession under the Due Process Clause or, in federal cases,
as a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
In the twenty-eight years following Brown, the Court reviewed thirty-five additional
confession cases. Although few of them involved physical violence rising to the level
seen in Brown, the continuous stream of cases made clear that the Court's decision in
Brown had not put to rest concerns about police misconduct or coercive interrogations.
In the ensuing years, the Court saw confessions induced with threats of violence by
third parties, 20 the denial of food, 12' and sleep deprivation. 22 The Court also began to
recognize that psychological tactics alone could render confessions involuntary,
especially when the accused
was confined incommunicado, separated from friends,
23
family, and attorneys.1
The case-by-case nature of the determination required by the Court's voluntariness
standard encouraged interrogators to push the constitutional envelope. Because the
voluntariness of a confession could be determined only in the context of the "totality of
the circumstances," law enforcement was left with little guidance about what tactics
were permissible. Instead, the Court sent what Professor Schulhofer has called "a
fatally mixed message" to police. 24 On the one hand, a skilled interrogator's job is to
persuade recalcitrant suspects to "come clean."'125 On the other hand, he is not to
overcome the suspect's will.' 26 The Court's case-by-case approach to determining
voluntariness rendered coerced confessions inevitable, "not because some officers will
deliberately flau[n]t the law but because even
the best of professionals will inevitably
127
misjudge the elusive psychological line."'
2. The Search for Rules
The first clear indication that at least a plurality of the Court was looking for a
different doctrinal regime to govern interrogations came in Spano v. New York, 128 in
which the Court held that a young, uneducated, emotionally unstable immigrant's
confession was involuntary when numerous officers had questioned him
incommunicado throughout the night, ignoring his repeated requests for counsel.
Although the majority's opinion applied the prevailing "totality of circumstances"

120. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560,564-65 (1958) (defendant with fifth grade education
was told that thirty to forty people would be waiting for him if he did not confess).
121. Id.
at 564 (defendant denied food for twenty-four hours).
122. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 149-52 (1944) (thirty-six hours of sleep
deprivation led to defendant's alleged confession).
123. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49,53 (1949) ("When a suspect speaks because he
is overborne, it is immaterial whether he has been subjected to a physical or a mental ordeal.").
124. Steven J. Schulhofer, Miranda's PracticalEffect: SubstantialBenefits and Vanishingly
Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 500, 554 (1996).
125. Id. at 555.
126. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936).
127. Schulhofer, supra note 124, at 555.
128. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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standard under due process, 129 Justice Douglas's concurring opinion, joined by Justices
Black and Brennan, emphasized Spano's requests for counsel and the fact that he had
already been indicted, not merely arrested, when he confessed. 130 Justice Stewart's
separate concurring opinion, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, also emphasized
the importance of lawyers in the interrogation room and would have held that the right
to counsel protected defendants not only during31 trial but also "under midnight
inquisition in the squad room of a police station."'
Five years later, a majority of the Court followed the trail blazed by Spano and
applied the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel to the interrogation room. In Massiah
v. UnitedStates,132 the defendant had been indicted in a drug conspiracy, had retained
counsel, and was released on bail when the government arranged for the defendant's
co-conspirator to wear a wire during a conversation with the defendant, permitting the
government to surreptitiously listen to the defendant's statements. Although the
statements were made voluntarily, without police coercion, and therefore, with no
violation of due process, the Court reached to the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel
to hold that the government could not use against the defendant a statement
"deliberately
elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his
133
counsel."'
In Escobedo v. Illinois,'34 the Court went still further in a 5-4 decision, extending
the reach of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel to a suspect who had not yet been
formally charged. After Escobedo was arrested for murder, he asked for a lawyer
several times, to no avail. 35 A lawyer retained by his family even appeared at the
police station on Escobedo's behalf, but his repeated requests to confer with his client
were denied. 36 Instead, police interrogated Escobedo incommunicado, in handcuffs
while standing, confronted him with incriminating information, and gave him false
promises of freedom and immunity if he confessed.137 The Court probably could have
suppressed the confession on due process grounds-probablybecause of the inherent
uncertainties in that case-by-case determination. However, the Court instead relied on
the Sixth Amendment, even though Escobedo, unlike the defendant in Massiah, had
not yet been formally charged, and even though the Sixth Amendment confers the right
to counsel only upon "the accused" in a "criminal prosecution."' 38 Stretching the Sixth
Amendment's language to its limits, the Court held that when Escobedo's requests for
a lawyer were denied, the police investigation was "no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime,"' 139 but instead a "focus on a particular suspect,' 14 0 rendering

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See id.
at 323-24.
See id.
at 325-26.
Id. at 327.
377 U.S. 201 (1964).
Id.
at206.
378 U.S. 478,485 (1964).
Id. at 481.
Id.
at 480-81.
Id. at 479-83.

138. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

139. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490.
140. Id.
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Escobedo141the "accused," and thus protected by the Sixth Amendment's right to
counsel.

3. A Fifth Amendment Prophylactic
In the two years following the Court's decision in Escobedo, lower courts struggled
to determine the scope of the Court's "focus" test. When the Court granted certiorari in
Miranda, the case was expected to provide the Court an opportunity to clarify the
reach of Escobedo, 142 which the lower court had held did not extend to suspects who,
like Miranda, did not explicitly request an attorney. Instead, the Court shifted course in
Miranda,still emphasizing the role of counsel in the interrogation room, but this time
doing so not under the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel, but under the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. The Court was now positioned to
use the Fifth Amendment privilege as a doctrinal basis to reach interrogations by state
actors, having incorporated the right in 1964.141 Anchoring its opinion around the Fifth
Amendment also permitted the Court to regulate pre-indictment interrogations on a
sounder constitutional basis than the Sixth Amendment logic of Escobedo, which had
fallen under considerable criticism. 1"
Emphasizing the potential for coercion inherent in the psychological strategies
employed by interrogators, the Court announced a new rule in Miranda: statements
obtained through custodial interrogation are inadmissible against the defendant unless
the police use procedural safeguards to notify the suspect of his right to silence and to
ensure the suspect an opportunity to exercise that right.145 While acknowledging the
possibility that law enforcement might devise alternative procedures, the Court's
admonition that the procedures had to be "at least as effective" as those set forth by the
Court rendered Miranda's now famous warnings-along with the accompanying
promise of a lawyer-a prerequisite to custodial interrogation.'" In short, the Court
created an irrebuttable presumption that any confession was coerced if obtained during
custodial interrogation without first informing the defendant of his right to remain
silent 1and his right to an attorney for the purpose of deciding whether to exercise that
right. 47

141. Id. at 491.
142. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,440-42 (1966); see also George C. Thomas III,
Missing Miranda's Story, 2 Orno ST. J. CiuM. L. 677, 681 (2005) (book review) (noting that
Court watchers expected Mirandato clarify the reach of Escobedo).
143. See Malloyv. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
144. Cf Thomas, supra note 142, at 681 (recounting the history of Mirandaand noting that
"Escobedo was a 5-4 case with a wobbly superstructure based on the Sixth Amendment, which
by its terms applies only to an 'accused' against whom a 'criminal prosecution' has begun").
145. Miranda,384 U.S. at 444.
146. Id. at 467.
147. See Cassell, supra note 113, at 193 ("The Mirandadecision largely replaced [the] caseby-case voluntariness analysis with general procedural requirements governing law enforcement
questioning of suspects in custody.").
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B. Rules Over Standards in CriminalProcedure

In a long line of cases following Miranda,the Court emphasized the prophylactic
nature of the rule, repeatedly separating the Fifth Amendment's privilege against selfincrimination from the rule created in Mirandato safeguard that privilege. 148 Although
the explicitly prophylactic nature of Mirandarendered it controversial, in many ways
the Court's shift from a case-by-case determination of voluntariness to per se rules to
regulate confessions can be seen as just one example ofthe Court's50frequent preference
149
for rules over standards in constitutional criminal procedure. 1
Consider, for example, the use of rules in the Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. The Fourth Amendment's overarching guarantee is a standard that

148. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1985) (holding that the fruits of the
poisonous tree doctrine did not apply to Mirandaviolations because Mirandaviolations are not
violations of the Fifth Amendment); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651, 668-69 (1984)
(concluding that "overriding considerations ofpublic safety" could justify the failure to provide
Mirandawarnings because the Mirandadoctrine was not constitutionally required); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,446-48 (1974) (permitting the government to use evidence derived from
a Miranda-defective statement, but not the suspect's defective statement itself, because the
government did not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege, "but departed only from the
prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege");
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26 (1971) (permitting the government to use a
Miranda-defective statement, but not an involuntary statement, to impeach the defendant's
testimony at trial). Although the Court has subsequently made clear that Miranda'ssafeguards
are constitutionally required, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,444 (2000), the doctrine
is still properly characterized as a prophylactic rule, distinguishable from the "core" right to be
free of compelled testimony. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636-37 (2004)
(characterizing Miranda as a prophylactic rule); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772-73
(2003) (Thomas, J., plurality opinion) (characterizing Mirandaas a "prophylactic measure" to
protect the "core" privilege not to be a witness against oneself at a criminal trial); Dickerson,
530 U.S. at 442 (justifying Miranda as necessary to ensure that involuntary custodial
confessions were not overlooked in the "traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test").
149. The distinction between rules and standards is a familiar one. Rules attempt to define
law with clarity and predictability, while standards require direct application of the policies and
goals underlying the law. See generallyDuncan Kennedy, Form andSubstance in PrivateLaw
Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1687-89 (1976); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword.The

Justices ofRules andStandards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 58 (1992) (noting that a standard "tends
to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or
policy to a fact situation," while a rule "binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way
to the presence of delimited triggering facts" (footnote omitted)).
150. A considerable amount of literature questions the distinction between so-called
prophylactic rules, which trigger controversy, and the general use of rule-like constitutional law.
See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 109, at 25 (suggesting that "there really isn't any such thing as a
distinctively prophylactic rule that is in any important way distinguishable from the more runof-the-mill doctrine that courts routinely establish and implement regarding every constitutional
norm"); Klein, supra note 109, at 1037; Strauss, supranote 110, at 190 ("'Prophylactic rules'
are not exceptional measures of questionable legitimacy but are a central and necessary feature
of constitutional law."); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Ripeness of Self-IncriminationClause
Disputes, 95 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1261, 1282 (2005) ("The Court has created many

prophylactic rules that are constitutionally based.").
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requires all searches and seizures to be "reasonable.' 5' However, the Court has
grounded that standard in a general rule that searches and seizures, to be reasonable,
must be supported by a warrant issued upon probable cause.' 52 The Court has also
recognized numerous exceptions to the warrant rule, and, here again, the Court has
often turned to rules over standards.
Although many of the exceptions to the warrant rule use standard-like approaches,
requiring case-by-case fact-finding, many more use a rule-like approach, providing
certainty about the scope of the exception at the expense of ensuring that the
government's conduct is reasonable on the facts of an individual case. For example, the
exigency exception to the warrant requirement is defined with reference to a
standard.1 53 Police may search without a warrant when the facts of an individual case
give rise to a reasonable belief that evidence will be destroyed, a suspect will escape,
or the public or police will be at risk if the police stop to complete the warrant
process. 54 Despite the existence of this standard-based exception to the warrant
requirement, the Court has recognized other, rule-like exceptions that are grounded in
55
underlying concerns about exigency, such as the search incident to arrest doctrine'
and the automobile exception.156 Rather than require the government to litigate, case by
case, the exigent circumstances presented by the search of an arrestee or a "readily
movable"' 57 vehicle, the Court has carved out bright line rules rendering these searches
reasonable, even when it may be unreasonable to believe that an individual arrestee
might destroy evidence 58 or that an individual vehicle might elude police.' 59 The Court
has also opted for bright-line rules when delineating the scope of exceptions to the
warrant requirement. For example, a search incident to arrest extends to the so-called
"grab area" within a suspect's reach. 160 For suspects arrested in cars, the Court has
adopted a bright-line rule that the lawful search area includes the entire passenger
compartment,
no matter how short the arrestee's arms and no matter how cavernous the
16 1
vehicle.
Because of the gap between rules and their underlying justifications, rule-like
exceptions to the warrant requirement will inevitably sweep in searches that are not
reasonable on their individual facts. Nevertheless, bright-line rules are attractive,
particularly in the criminal procedure context, because they give clear notice to police

151. U.S. CONST.amend. IV.

152. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948); see also Klein, supra
note 109, at 1042 (characterizing the Fourth Amendment's warrant rule as a prophylactic rule).
153. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1967).
154. See id. at 298-300.
155. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,232-33 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).

156. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1925).
157. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-51 (1970).
158. In Robinson, for example, there was no reason to believe the defendant was carrying
either evidence or weapons. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236. Nevertheless, the Court held that
the mere arrest of the defendant rendered a search of his person reasonable without a warrant or
probable cause. Id.
159. See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52 (upholding the search of an impounded vehicle
without a warrant).
160. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
161. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981).
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about the scope of their authority and to individuals about the scope of their
constitutional protection.162 The Court has carved out per se rules rendering searches
incident to arrest and searches of automobiles reasonable, not because exigent
circumstances would justify the government's conduct in every such case, but because
of the belief that there will be exigent circumstances in enough of the cases to justify
the rule.
In these Fourth Amendment examples, the effect of bright-line rules was to expand
the scope of police authority and to constrict the constitutional rights of individuals
beyond the baseline established by standard-like doctrines. 163 In contrast, the
prophylactic rule drawn by the Court in Mirandaexpanded the rights of individuals
and limited the admissibility of confessions compared to the baseline established by the
"core" Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory testimony.164 In other respects,
however, the construct invoked by the Court in Mirandawas unspectacular given the
frequency with which the Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence has exchanged the
precision of case-by-case standards for the clarity and predictability of bright line
65
rules.
Furthermore, by the time the Court granted certiorari in Miranda,it had concluded
that a rule-based approach was necessary to regulate custodial interrogations. The
standard-based approach, in which confessions were evaluated for voluntariness under
the totality of the circumstances, had proven unsatisfactory. 66 The incommunicado
nature of many investigations, combined with the subtle psychological ploys used by
police, rendered it difficult for reviewing courts to recreate the interrogations to
determine whether they were coercive. 167 As a consequence, case-by-case adjudications
of voluntariness were likely to have a high error rate, with courts failing to discern
coercion even where it existed. Moreover, with so many factors thrown into the
"totality of circumstances" mix-a test in which "[a]lmost everything was relevant, but
almost nothing was decisive" --and with the limited number of decisions the Court

162. Id. at458-60.
163. Professor Klein has distinguished between prophylactic rules and "constitutional safe
harbor rules." Klein, supra note 109, at 1033. While prophylactic rules, such as Miranda,overprotect constitutional rights and prohibit some government behavior that would otherwise be
permitted without the rule, "safe harbor rules" potentially under-protect the right at issue and
allow government behavior that would otherwise be prohibited without the rule. Id.
164. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985) ("The Mirandaexclusionary rule..
•serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself."); cf.
Klein, supra note 109, at 1038-44 (discussing multiple examples of prophylactic rules in
criminal procedure).
165. See Klein, supra note 109, at 1039-40 (noting that "[d]espite its failing in particular
cases," the Miranda rule "instrumentally advances Fifth Amendment values because, in most
cases, it will be difficult for the Court to determine after the fact whether persistent attempts by
officials to persuade a defendant to waive his right resulted in compulsion"); Strauss, supranote
110, at 196 (justifying the rationale of Mirandabecause "the absence of relatively clear rules
creates a danger of impermissible official action and makes it more difficult for a reviewing
court to detect such action").
166. See DRESSLER, supra note 113, at 389.
167. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,445 (1966) (noting the difficulty of describing
what occurs during an interrogation).
168. Yale Kamisar, Gates, "ProbableCause," "GoodFaith,"andBeyond, 69 IowA L. REv.
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could feasibly announce, a coherent definition of "voluntary" had failed to emerge.1
Police were therefore left with inadequate guidance about the line that divided savvy
interrogation from unconstitutional coercion. 170 The Court adopted a bright-line rule in
Miranda not because all unwarned confessions are involuntary, but because something
other than a case-by-case inquiry into7 voluntariness was necessary to protect
defendants from coercive interrogation. 1 '
The same necessities that pushed the Court to adopt a rule-like approach to
interrogations in Mirandajustify a rule-based approach to prosecutorial disclosure.
The details surrounding an interrogation are difficult to replicate, but Bagley's
materiality requirement expects defendants to "re"-create an event that never even
occurred-a trial in which the defendant had access to the exculpatory evidence at
issue. Just as bright line rules were necessary to protect defendants from the inherent
psychological pressures of custodial interrogation, bright lines are necessary 1to
72
mitigate the influence of cognitive biases on prosecutors' disclosure decisions. 173
Similar to the conscientious police who were confused by a "fatally mixed message"'
that they should get their confession but respect the suspect's free will, well-intentioned
prosecutors are torn between their dual obligations to punish the guilty while protecting
the innocent.174
And just as the "totality of circumstances" test proved too fact-specific to provide a
coherent body of case law to regulate confessions, case-by-case determinations of the
materiality of undisclosed evidence have failed to produce clear guidelines for
prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory evidence. Forty-five years have passed since
the Court announced its decision in Brady, and yet the widespread failure of
prosecutors to disclose Brady material is well known.175 Moreover, the costs ofBrady
violations are intolerably high. The exonerations of more than two hundred criminal
defendants based on post-conviction DNA evidence 176 have forced an

551,570 (1984).
169. See Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness,Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L.
REv. 859, 863 (1979); Klein, supra note 109, at 1035-36.
170. See Klein, supra note 109, at 1035-36; Schulhofer, supra note 124, at 555-56.
171. Scholars generally agree that the Court should create prophylactic rules only when
necessary. Klein, supra note 109, at 1068 (maintaining that the Court should create prophylactic
rules "only when absolutely necessary"); Landsberg, supra note 109, at 926 ("Necessity is the
basis for fashioning a prophylactic rule."); Mannheimer, supra note 150, at 1282 ("Only when
strict necessity dictates the need for a prophylactic rule may the Court impose such a judgemade rule on the other branches of government and the States.").
172. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the ways in which the materiality standard
amplifies cognitive biases and invites prosecutors to under-disclose.
173. Schulhofer, supra note 124, at 554.
174. See Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the tension between prosecutors' dual roles.
175. See Gershman,supra note 5, at 688 ("[I]t is readily apparent that Brady violations are
among the most pervasive and recurring types of prosecutorial violations."); Hoeffel, supranote
50, at 1148 ("Withholding favorable evidence ... seems to be the norm."); Johns, supra note
58, at 146 ("Unfortunately, Brady violations are one of the most common forms--if not the
most common form-of prosecutorial misconduct, yet discipline is rarely imposed." (emphasis
in original)); Yaroshefsky, supra note 47, at 281-82 (discussing reported decisions finding
proseculorial suppression of exculpatory evidence in the Bronx District Attorney's Office).
176. Innocence Project, Know the Cases, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (listing
223 exonerations since 1977).
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acknowledgement not only that our criminal justice system convicts the innocent, 177 but
also that prosecutorial suppression of Brady material constitutes a leading cause of
wrongful convictions. 178 Empirical evidence from the Innocence Project suggests that
nearly half of the cases in which innocent defendants have been exonerated based on
post-conviction DNA evidence involved prosecutorial misconduct, and more than a
third of the misconduct involved the nondisclosure ofexculpatory evidence.179 Another
set of researchers found that sixteen to nineteen percent of reversals
in capital cases
80
were attributable to the nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence.'
The Brady doctrine has failed to accomplish its objective of providing defendants
access to material exculpatory evidence, and the costs of that failure are borne not by

177. Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 237,237 (describing
today as "an exciting new period of American criminal justice, one directly related to the
acknowledgment that we convict innocent people"); see also PETER J. NEUFELD & BARRY C.
ScHEcK, THE FIRST NATIONAL DEFENSE SYMPOSIUM ON

DNA: UNDERSTANDING, CHALLENGING
(stating that "the extent of

AND CONTROLLING THE NEW EVIDENCE OF THE 90'S xxix (1990)

factually incorrect convictions in our system must be much greater than anyone wants to
believe"); David Feige, The Way We Live Now: The DarkSide ofInnocence, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 15 (declaring that "[a]n entire innocence movement is afoot").
178. Gershman, supra note 50, at 439 ("It is not an understatement to say that prosecutorial
suppression of evidence presents perhaps one of the principal threats to a system of rational and
fair fact-finding."); Hoeffel, supra note 50, at 1150 ("Despite the instincts of the good
prosecutor and the former-prosecutor-turned judge that only the guilty benefit from a rule of
disclosure, it appears that the risk of convicting innocent people through withholding of
favorable evidence is intolerably high.").
179. The Innocence Project is a litigation and public policy organization that, as of October
18, 2008, had assisted in 223 exonerations based on newly tested DNA evidence. See Innocence
Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/. The Innocence Project reports that prosecutorial
misconduct played a role in thirty-three of the first seventy-four DNA exonerations, and thirtyseven percent of the misconduct involved suppression of exculpatory evidence. See The
Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: Forensic Science Misconduct,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Govemment-Misconduct.php; see also BARRY
SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DwYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE app. 2 (2000) (reporting that
twenty-six of sixty-two wrongful conviction cases involved prosecutorial misconduct and that
forty-three percent of those cases involved suppression of exculpatory evidence); Hugo Adam
Bedeau & Michael L. Radelet, MiscarriagesofJustice in PotentiallyCapitalCases,40 STAN. L.
REV. 21, 57 tbl. 6 (1987) (reporting that thirty-five of 350 wrongful convictions resulted from
prosecutorial suppression of evidence); Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict:
Dishonor,CHI. TRi., Jan. 10, 1999, at 3 (reporting that 381 homicide convictions nationwide
had been reversed because prosecutors failed to disclose exculpatory evidence or presented

evidence they knew to be false).
180. The study initially found that sixteen percent of reversals in capital cases resulted from
"prosecutorial suppression of evidence that the defendant is innocent or does not deserve the death
penalty." James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jonathan Lloyd, CapitalAttrition:
ErrorRatesin CapitalCases, 1973-1995,78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1850 (2000). In an update to the
same study, the researchers reported that the suppression of exculpatory and mitigating evidence
was a factor in nineteen percent of capital case reversals. JAMES S. LmBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN,
ANDREW GELMAN, VALERIE WEST, GARTH DAVIES & ALEXANDER KISS, A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II:
WHY THERE Is So MUCH ERROR INCAPrIAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2002),
availableat http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/report.pdf.
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the guilty, but by the innocent. Only a rule requiring prosecutors to disclose more than
true Brady material will protect a defendant's right to receive the evidence to which he
is entitled under due process.
IV. A PROPHYLACTIC RULE TO GOVERN PROSECUTORIAL DIsCLOsuRE

A separate issue from the appropriateness of a prophylactic rule to over-protect
Brady rights is the question of the proper scope of the rule. Central to the shaping of
the prophylactic rule is a balancing of its costs and benefits.' 8 ' This Part proposes two
potential rules--one with a close nexus to Brady, and one, more expansive-and
concludes that the modest version may not suffice to protect the core Brady right. It
then turns to a discussion of how the costs of broader over-protection could be
reduced.
A. The Rule
One possible prophylactic approach would be to require prosecutors to disclose all
exculpatory evidence, whether they believe it meets the materiality standard or not.
Such a requirement would mirror ethical rules already in place but elevate them to the
level of constitutional criminal procedure. 8 2 A prophylactic rule requiring prosecutors
to disclose to the defense all evidence that might reasonably be considered exculpatory
has considerable attraction.
First, such a rule would reduce the distorting effects of the cognitive biases that are
triggered by the materiality standard when prosecutors are forced to weigh the potential
exculpatory value of the evidence at issue against the strength of what would otherwise
be the government's case against the defendant.' 8 3 Social scientists have found that
forcing subjects to articulate opposing viewpoints reduces the effects of cognitive
bias.18 Relying on this social science evidence, an emerging literature focusing on the

181. See Landsberg, supra note 109; David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and
Congress, 99 MICH. L. REv. 958, 962-63 (2001) (using a cost-benefit analysis to defend
Miranda).
182. See supra notes 78 and 96-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ethical
rules governing prosecutorial disclosure.

183. See supra Part II.B. Ifor a discussion of the effects of cognitive bias on prosecutorial
disclosure under Brady.
184. Craig A. Anderson & Elizabeth S. Sechler, Effects of Explanation and
Counterexplanationon the Development and Use of Social Theories, 50 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.

PSYCHOL. 24, 27-29 (1986) (finding that subjects' generation of counterarguments reversed the
effects of bias-induced beliefs); Joel Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understandingthe Limits of
Limiting Instructions:Social PsychologicalExplanationsfor the Failuresof Instructions to
DisregardPretrialPublicityand Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.

677, 691 (2000) (concluding that belief perseverance can be reduced if people articulate
arguments in support of contrary beliefs); Charles G. Lord, Mark R. Lepper & Elizabeth
Preston, Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1239 (1984) (concluding that induced counterargument
helped mitigate the effects of confirmation bias and selective information processing); Raymond
S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REv. GEN.
PSYCHOL. 175, 188 (1998) (suggesting that the articulation of counterarguments can reduce
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distorting effects of cognitive bias in prosecutors emphasizes that prosecutors should
routinely "switch sides" on their files and review cases from the perspective of defense
counsel.18 5 However, the current materiality standard invites prosecutors to weigh the
exculpatory value of the evidence at issue from their own perspective. In contrast, a
rule mandating disclosure of all evidence that might reasonably be seen as favorable to
the defense's case requires the prosecutor to step into the shoes of the defense lawyer,
thereby8 reducing
the distorting effects of their personal opinion that the defendant is
6
guilty.
A prophylactic rule requiring prosecutors to disclose all favorable evidence would
also reduce at least some of the tension that conscientious prosecutors experience as
they seek to balance their dual roles as protectors of the innocent and prosecutors of
the guilty.' 8 7 Because the Brady doctrine currently entitles defendants to receive
exculpatory evidence only if it undermines confidence in the resulting criminal
conviction, the doctrine permits prosecutors to justify the suppression of other
exculpatory evidence as a legally permissible tactic-a hard blow, but not a foul one. A
rule grounded in constitutional criminal procedure that entitles defendants to receive all
exculpatory evidence would force prosecutors to redefine the scope of the disclosure
they must provide in order to do justice.
A final advantage of a prophylactic rule requiring disclosure of all exculpatory
evidence, regardless of materiality, is that it hews closely to the core right that it seeks
to protect. The cost of any rule-based doctrine is that it inevitably sweeps into its scope
cases that might not conform to the rule's underlying justifications on the individual
facts ofthe case. A prophylactic rule requiring disclosure of all favorable evidence has
a close nexus to a defendant's core right under due process to receive material
exculpatory evidence and therefore has relatively few costs. Indeed, the dissent in
Bagley would have construed Brady itself to require disclosure of "all information...
that might reasonably be considered favorable to the defendant's case."' 188 The only

overconfidence). See generallyGregory Mitchell, Why Law andEconomics'PerfectRationality
Should Not Be TradedforBehavioralLaw and Economics'EqualIncompetence, 91 GEO. L.J.

67, 133 & n.207 (reporting that "asking or directing experimental subjects to consider
alternative or opposing arguments, positions, or evidence has been found to ameliorate the
adverse effects of several biases").
185. See Bibas, supra note 47, at 2523-24; Burke, supra note 63, at 1618 (advocating the
practice of switching sides); Findley & Scott, supra note 20, at 371-72 (advocating mechanisms
to encourage counterargument throughout investigation and prosecution); Russell B. Korobkin
& Thomas S. Ulen, Law and BehavioralScience: Removing the Rationality Assumption from
Law andEconomics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051, 1094 (2000) (suggesting in the civil context that
negotiating parties could reduce the effects of cognitive bias by analyzing disputes "through the
eyes of their opponents"); Michael J. Saks & D. Michael Risinger, Baserates,The Presumption
of Guilt, Admissibility Rulings, and Erroneous Convictions, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1051,
1056-57 (observing that others have previously suggested that investigators neutralize their
"presumption of guilt" by searching for exculpatory evidence).
186. Burke, supra note 63, at 1631 (arguing that a disclosure standard requiring prosecutors
to review evidence from the defense's perspective would "avoid the recipe for cognitive disaster
that is inherent in the current Brady standard").
187. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of how conscientious prosecutors might believe
that they "do justice" by withholding exculpatory evidence that is not material.
188. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 695-96 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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"cost" to a prophylactic rule' 8 9 requiring the same would be the disclosure of Bradylike evidence-that is exculpatory but not material evidence. But this is not a
significant cost. If the evidence is immaterial, then by definition it will not create a
reasonable doubt, and therefore its disclosure will not thwart the government's case
against the defendant. Moreover, the Court's view that prudent prosecutors will err "in
favor of disclosure"' 19 and "disclose a favorable piece of evidence"'' reflects the
belief that the disclosure of immaterial exculpatory evidence not only imposes few
costs, but is actually preferred. As the Court wrote in Kyles, a prudent prosecutor's
decision to over-disclose "will serve to justify trust in the prosecutor... [and] will tend
as
to preserve the criminal trial, as distinct from the prosecutor's private deliberations,
192
the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal accusations."
The problem with a prophylactic rule requiring disclosure of only exculpatory
evidence is that it ultimately fails to protect the core right that it seeks to ensure.
Despite its prophylactic structure, the "rule" still uses a standard-like approach to
disclosure, distinguishing exculpatory evidence from other evidence not subject to
disclosure. This formulation relieves prosecutors of the decision of whether
exculpatory evidence is material, but still leaves them to determine whether the
evidence is favorable to the defense in the first instance.' 93 Because the prosecutor is
unaware of the facts known to the defense, or the defense's theory of the case, she may
fail to appreciate the favorability of evidence. 94 For example, in a murder case in
which the police seize from the defendant's car the murder weapon and evidence tying
the defendant to the victim, there would be no apparent exculpatory value to the fact
that police originally focused on the defendant because a witness named Jim Smith
tipped them off to the defendant's involvement. If, however, unbeknownst to the

189. The costs of complying with the rule (over-disclosure) must be separated from the costs
of providing a remedy for rule violations. The ability to separate prophylactic rules from postconviction remedies is discussed infra in Part IV.B.2.
190. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976).

191. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995).
192. Id. at 439-40.

193. See id.
at 439 (noting that "even if' due process required the government to disclose all
exculpatory evidence, prosecutors "would still be forced to make judgment calls about what
would count as favorable evidence").
194. It was partially this concern that motivated Justice Marshall's dissents from the cases
defining the current materiality standard. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 698
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Evidence that is of doubtful worth in the eyes ofthe prosecutor could
");
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 117 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
be of inestimable value to the defense ....
("[E]ven a conscientious prosecutor will fail to appreciate the significance of some items of
information."); see also Bibas, supra note 15, at 143 (noting that prosecutors have a "poor
sense" of both the government's and the defense's evidence until trial and will therefore "have

difficulty forecasting before trial what evidence will in retrospect seem to have been material");
Johns, supra note 58, at 147-48 ("Marginal evidence-viewed through the eyes of defense
counsel-might be the key to unraveling the case and exonerating the accused."); Prosser, supra
note 20, at 569 (noting that prosecutors might be incapable of assessing the materiality of
evidence to the defense when they lack knowledge that the evidence corroborates the
defendant's version of events); Stacy, supra note 48, at 1393 ("A prosecutor's lack of
information about the planned defense and partisan inclinations impede her from making an
accurate and objective assessment of the evidence's effect on the outcome.").
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government, Jim Smith and the defendant are sworn enemies in a lifelong feud that
makes the Hatfields and McCoys look like good neighbors, the origin of the
investigation could prove to be the lynchpin in a claim that the defendant was framed
and the evidence against him planted. Because prosecutors lack the knowledge
necessary to recognize the exculpatory nature of the evidence they hold, the only
means of ensuring that defendants receive the material exculpatory evidence to which
they are entitled under Brady is to require "open file" discovery 95 in which
prosecutors disclose all96evidence known to the government, whether it seems to
inculpate or exculpate.1
Of course, an expansion of the gap between a prophylactic rule and the core right it
protects comes with corresponding costs. Unlike a prophylactic rule applying only to
exculpatory evidence, mandated open file disclosure sweeps well past a defendant's
core due process right to receive material exculpatory evidence, and therefore imposes
additional costs. However, just as the Court has fashioned ways of reducing the costs
of the Mirandarule, the costs of open file discovery can be mitigated as well.
B. Reducing the Costs of a ProphylacticRule
A prophylactic rule requiring prosecutors to disclose all evidence to the defense
poses two separate cost concerns. The first is the cost of the disclosure of evidence
itself. Although seemingly inculpatory evidence may in some cases turn out to be true
Brady material-both exculpatory and material-in most cases, seeming inculpatory
evidence will be simply that. The second cost concern is the cost of remedying rule
violations. By definition, Brady permits reversal of only those convictions rendered
factually questionable by the undisclosed evidence. However, if a prophylactic rule
requires broader prosecutorial disclosure, defendants will seek post-conviction relief
even when the undisclosed evidence does not undermine the conviction's reliability.
Each of these concerns, and approaches to mitigate the potential costs, are discussed in
turn.

195. Several scholars have previously called for open file discovery. Comment, Brady v.
Maryland and the Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 112, 113 (1972) ("[T]he
prosecutor's entire file should, except in special cases, be open to defense inspection."); Peter A.
Joy, Brady andJailhouseInformants: Responding to Injustice, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 619,
641 (2007) ("The surest way to meet and exceed Brady disclosure obligations is to adopt an
'open file' discovery policy."); Maximo Langer, Rethinking PleaBargaining:The Practiceand
Reform ofProsecutorialAdjudication in American CriminalProcedure,33 AM. J.CRIM. L. 223,
276 (2006) (recommending that prosecutors use open file policies to reduce "prosecutorial
adjudication" and prevent coercive plea bargaining); James S. Liebman, The Overproductionof
Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030,2145-56 (2000) (calling for open file access incapital cases).
But see Bennett L. Gershman, LitigatingBrady v. Maryland: Games ProsecutorsPlay,57 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 531, 544-46 (2007) (warning of the "opportunities for gamesmanship" under
even open file policies).
196. See FED. R.CRIM. P. 16(a)(2) (excluding from the government's discovery obligations
"reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made by an attorney for the
government or other government agent in connection with investigating or prosecuting the
case").
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1. Reducing the Costs of Mandatory Disclosure

Whereas the disclosure of exculpatory evidence imposes few (or no) costs, the
disclosure of inculpatory evidence is considerably more controversial. Because
criminal defendants have limited obligations to disclose information to the government,
a sense of fair play suggests that prosecutors should generally be entitled to withhold
discovery as well.197 Opponents of broad discovery in criminal cases also argue that
defendants will abuse their access to the government's evidence by intimidating the
witnesses against them and tailoring their defense through perjury and the subornation
of perjury. 198 However, experience with broad criminal discovery suggests that these
risks are overstated. Several states mandate broad disclosure in criminal cases,' 99 and
the European continental justice system permits defendants the same access to
evidence as the prosecution. 200 As Richard Rosen has noted, "[t]here is not a shred of
evidence 1that these criminal justice systems have suffered any drop in efficiency as a
20
result."
Furthermore, many prosecutors already voluntarily disclose more than Brady
requires them to. At the very least, some may disclose Brady-like evidence to avoid
Brady violations and to comply with their ethical obligations to disclose all favorable
evidence.20 2 Others go still further and provide the open file discovery that the Court
has refused to mandate as a requirement of due process.20 3 The voluntary adoption of

197. Givelber, supra note 82, at 1387.
198. William J. Brennan, Jr., The CriminalProsecution:SportingEvent or Questfor Truth?
A Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 6 (1990) (expressing concerns about defendants

tailoring their defense); Givelber, supra note 82, at 1387 (noting that the traditional
justifications for limiting a defendant's disclosure rights were concerns about witness
intimidation and perjury).
199. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1) (1999) (requiring disclosure of "the complete
files of all law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies involved"); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01(1)
(requiring broad disclosure, including witness statements, the names of grand jury witnesses, all

documents and tangible objects related to the case, and reports of examinations or tests); N.J. R.
CT. 3:13-3 (requiring broad discovery in criminal cases); see Tara L. Swafford, Responding to
Herrera v. Collins: Ensuring That Innocents Are Not Executed,45 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 603,
633-34 n.214 (1995) (reporting that Maryland, Florida, Colorado, Oregon, New Hampshire,
and Alabama require open file discovery in capital cases).
200. Richard S. Frase, The Search for the Whole Truth About American and European
CriminalJustice, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 785, 807-08 (2000); Kuo & Taylor, supra note 86, at
706-07; Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial,67 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 403, 413 (1992).
201. Rosen, supra note 177, at 274.
202. See Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The UndefinedResponsibilitiesof
FederalProsecutors,26 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 562-63 (1999) (discussing how ethical rules
require prosecutors to fill the "gaps" in constitutional requirements); Sundby, supra note 4, at
660.
203. William Bradford Middlekauff, What Practitioners Say About Broad Criminal
Discovery Practice,CRIM. JUST., Spring 1994, at 14, 55 (reporting that approximately three
quarters of federal prosecutors stated in a 1984 survey that they turn over more evidence than
legally required and that forty-two percent used an open file policy); Prosser, supra note 20, at
593-94 (summarizing evidence showing that both individual prosecutors and numerous
jurisdictions report having open file policies).
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open file policies by prosecutors is a strong indication that the costs of such disclosure
are either negligible or outweighed by other gains. One advantage of open file
discovery is that it reflects the commitment of a prosecutor's office to transparency,
which in turn promotes the appearance of prosecutorial accountability and institutional
fairness. 20 4 Open file discovery is also thought to bring more pragmatic advantages.
Defendants confronted with the evidence against them may be quicker to plead guilty if
the evidence is strong, or to argue persuasively for dismissal if the evidence is weak,
20 5
leading to the earlier resolution of cases and the elimination of unnecessary trials.
Those cases that do proceed to trial may be litigated more efficiently because the
defense attorney will have had an opportunity to identify the central issues in the case
prior to trial.
Open file discovery can require prosecutors to disclose evidence that would be
problematic in the defendant's hands, but protective orders and other measures can
mitigate those costs. Even the Miranda rule contains a public safety exception
20 6
permitting the government to forego Mirandawarnings in exigent circumstances.
Similarly, a prophylactic rule mandating broad disclosure should contain an exception
for cases in which disclosure would endanger witnesses, interfere with an ongoing
investigation, or otherwise jeopardize a governmental interest.20 7 Model Rule 3.8, for
example, which already requires disclosure of all evidence favorable to the defense,
enables prosecutors to seek protective orders when disclosure "could result in
substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest., 208 A similar exception to the
proposed prophylactic rule would reduce the costs of open file discovery by simply
shifting to the government
the burden of demonstrating why evidence should not be
20 9
disclosed to the defense.

204. For a general discussion of the importance of transparency to prosecutorial
accountability, see ANGELA DAvis, ARBITRARY JUSTICE (2007); Stephanos Bibas, Transparency
andParticipationin CriminalProcedure,81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911 (2006); Medwed, supranote
81, at 177-78 (advocating transparency in prosecutorial policies).
205. Martha Rayner, New York City's Criminal Courts: Are We Achieving Justice?, 31

FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1023, 1062 (2004) ("[Olpen file discovery could alleviate the need for some
court appearances and contribute to earlier resolutions of cases based on the merits.").
206. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984).
207. Prosser, supra note 20, at 595 (arguing that the presumption should be in favor of
disclosure unless the government establishes why information should not be disclosed); Rosen,
supra note 177, at 273 (arguing that "the presumption should change to favor disclosure rather

than secrecy"); H. Lee Sarokin & William Zuckerman, PresumedInnocent? Restrictions on
CriminalDiscovery in FederalCourt Belie This Presumption,43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1089, 1109
(1991) (arguing that early and complete disclosure should be required unless the government
demonstrates risks of such disclosure).
208. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) cmt. 3 (2004).
209. Put another way, the proposed prophylactic rule would establish only a rebuttable
presumption that evidence in the prosecutor's file is discoverable. See Joseph D. Grano,
ProphylacticRules in CriminalProcedure:A Question ofArticle llLegitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L.

REv. 100, 147-48 (1985) (noting that prophylactic rules are less objectionable when their
presumptions are rebuttable).
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2. Reducing the Costs of the Remedy

A separate potential cost to the proposed prophylactic rule is the cost of its
enforcement through post-conviction relief Because Bagley's materiality standard
combines the normative standard governing prosecutorial disclosure with the postconviction standard for appellate relief, the demonstration of a Brady violation
automatically leads to a reversal of the defendant's conviction. Moreover, because
there is an unlawful failure to disclose under Brady only if there is a reasonable
probability that the undisclosed evidence would have affected the verdict,21 ° the only
convictions disrupted on appeal are those whose outcomes are of dubious reliability.21'
The Court has defended the Bagley materiality standard by arguing that any broader
obligation to disclose would jeopardize the finality of reliable convictions.2 12 However,
this argument is circular in its assumption that the remedy for a failure to disclose
would necessarily be the reversal of the defendant's conviction. In reality, Bagley's
blurring of the normative standard with the standard for post-conviction relief stands
,,213 4,
,214
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,215
out among criminal procedure doctrines as "bizarre,
curious,
and "odd.
Outside the Brady context, the determination of whether a constitutional error has
occurred is separate from the determination of whether the error requires reversal.
Although structural defects that infect the entire trial process result in automatic
216
217
reversal,216 other trial errors are reviewed for harmless error. Accordingly, if the
proposed prophylactic rule were adopted, appellate courts would differentiate between
true Brady violations and violations of the prophylactic rule. If the prosecutor's failure
to disclose rose to the level of a true Brady violation, the conviction would be
automatically reversed, as it is under current doctrine.21 8 If instead the prosecutor
violated only the open file prophylactic rule designed to effectuate defendants' core

210. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
211. The Court made clear in Brady that its motivation was "not punishment of society for
misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused." Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see Steele, supra note 67, at 976 (noting that appellate courts reviewing
claims of prosecutorial misconduct are concerned with the conviction's validity, rather than "the
prosecutor's conduct per se").
212. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 n.7 (noting that "a rule that the prosecutor commits error
by any failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, no matter how insignificant, would
impose an impossible burden on the prosecutor and would undermine the interest inthe finality
of judgments.").
213. Burke, supra note 63, at 1607.
214. Douglass, supra note 63, at 471.
215. Sundby, supranote 4, at 658.
216. The Court has recognized that, unlike usual trial errors, "structural defects in the
constitution of the trial mechanism," such as the deprivation of the fight to counsel, defy
harmless error review and thereby require automatic reversal. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 309 (1991).
217. See generally Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding that
constitutional error is harmless if an appellate court is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that
it did not contribute to the conviction).
218. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995) ("[O]nce a reviewing court applying
Bagley has found constitutional error there is no need for further harmless-error review.").
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Brady rights, the
appellate court would affirm the conviction if the failure to disclose
219
was harmless.
Some might argue that the use of harmless error review for rule violations would
reduce the rule's costs at the expense of its utility, eviscerating the rule of any bite.
Prosecutors might ignore the prophylactic rule, knowing that the resulting conviction
would stand unless the violations rose to the level of a Brady error. This concern,
however, misses two points. First, it overlooks the impact on conscientious prosecutors
of a clear rule requiring broad disclosure, even if the rule carries no consequences if
violated. Currently, Bagley's materiality standard amplifies cognitive biases that can
cause ethical prosecutors to under-disclose.220 It also enables prosecutors to believe
that they are doing justice if they simply turn over Brady material, to the detriment of
other discovery. 221A clear rule requiring broad disclosure would expand discovery by
defendants, even if the rule contained no remedy at all.
Moreover, harmless error review provides defendants remedies beyond those
provided by the Brady doctrine, because Bagley's materiality standard is more
stringent than traditional harmless error review. Under the materiality standard, a
prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence constitutes error and requires reversal only
when the defendant establishes a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed.222 In
contrast, harmless error review requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the constitutional error was harmless. 223 Even ifthe defendant challenges the
constitutional error in a habeas corpus case, the conviction will be set aside if the error
"had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," 224 a
standard that the Court has noted is less stringent than Bagley'smateriality standard.225
Therefore, a prosecutor who intentionally withheld discoverable evidence would be
placing any eventual conviction in considerable jeopardy.
CONCLUSION

Forty-five years of experience since the Court's decision in Brady has proven that
the criminal justice system convicts the innocent more than any of us wants to admit,
and that prosecutorial failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence is a significant
contributor to wrongful convictions. This Article has advocated the recognition of a

219. This distinction would be similar to the Court's distinction between Mirandaviolations
and due process violations in the confessions context. See supra notes 145-48 and
accompanying text.
220. See supra Part ll.B.1.
221. See supra Part II.B.2.
222. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
223. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
224. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
225. The Court later rejected the Kotteakos standard for relief, stating, "Unless every
nondisclosure is regarded as automatic error, the constitutional standard of materiality must
impose a higher burden on the defendant." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976); see
also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995) (observing that the materiality standard
requires more of defendants than review under Brecht and Kotteakos).
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prophylactic rule to protect defendants' rights under due process to receive from the
government any evidence that undermines confidence in their guilt.
One version of a prophylactic rule to effectuate Brady rights would require
prosecutors to disclose all exculpatory evidence, regardless of whether they believe it
rises to the level of materiality as defined by Bagley. Such a rule would be a modest
reform, requiring of prosecutors only what is already mandated by ethical rules and
what the Court has already suggested is the "prudent" approach. 226 It would also
provide increased protection of core Brady rights in two ways. It would require
prosecutors to view the importance of the evidence at issue from the perspective of a
defense attorney, mitigating the cognitive biases that can contribute to Brady
violations. It would also relieve some of the current tension between a prosecutor's
dual roles to both protect the innocent and convict the guilty by making clear that
disclosure beyond material exculpatory evidence is part of doing justice.
Ultimately, however, a prophylactic rule applying only to exculpatory evidence falls
short of its objective. Because prosecutors are unaware offacts known to the defendant
and the theory of the defense's case, they may overlook the exculpatory value of
seemingly inculpatory facts. Accordingly, and more ambitiously, this Article has urged
a prophylactic rule requiring open file discovery in which prosecutors disclose not only
exculpatory evidence, but all of the evidence against the defendant. Admittedly,
broadening the gap between the scope of the prophylactic rule and its underlying core
right increases the potential costs of the rule. However, the costs of open file discovery
can be reduced by permitting exceptions to the rule and by separating the rule from
post-conviction remedies. Any remaining costs of open file discovery are negligible
compared to the proven and intolerable costs of the current regime: avoidable
convictions of the innocent.

226. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108.

